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Premise 
 
This dissertation is composed by three separated articles and carries out an analysis of 
the effects of bancassurance ties in the Italian life insurance industry from several 
perspectives. Departing from an analysis of the relevant literature, two separated empirical 
econometric analyses are developed focusing on the effects of bancassurance respectively 
on scale economies and on insurers’ asset risk profile.  
We consider the Italian market due to the importance of bancassurance ventures, its  
diversified life insurance sector, its recent volatility and its compliance with European and 
country-specific regulation. Our analyses focus on responses to regulatory and 
macroeconomic changes looking at competition (of which scale economies can be 
considered an indicator), concentration and investments’ choices (asset risk profile).  
The general literature on bancassurance has analyzed the optimal way to enter the 
insurance market mainly from the bank point of view. Less attention has been paid to 
insurers’ standpoint. In the first part of the dissertation we critically discuss the main issues 
on bancassurance studied so far and we highlight existing gaps. In particular we suggest to 
study the cooperative agreements between banks and insurers by using. In our view this 
approach, which has already been applied to the analysis of the co- existence of several 
distribution channels, is also appropriate to explain the co – existence of different degree of 
integration between banks and insurance companies.  
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The second part of the dissertation investigates the existence of scale economies into the life 
insurance industry in Italy, looking for differences in the level of optimal scale across 
bancassurance groups. The originality of this study lies in fastening together two separated 
strand of literature: the general literature on financial conglomeration, in particular on 
bancassurance ventures, and the studies concerning the existence of scale economies in the 
life insurance market. In general, relying on the financial conglomeration literature, we 
expect that bancassurance groups are better able to exploit scale economies.  
We considered the span 1998 – 2012 dividing the panel into three groups based on 
ownership linkages with banks. Relying on a micro - econometric procedure, two cost 
functions are estimated dividing the span into pre crisis and post crisis periods. Results show 
that, before the crisis hit, insurers independent from banks operated on their optimal scale 
while bancassurers operated at decreasing return to scale, thus no further conglomeration 
was needed within the sector, in particular with respect to bancassurance groups. After the 
crisis results indicate overall increasing return to scale although the industry has undergone 
substantial consolidation. 
Taking into consideration the enhancement of managerial and supervisory actions on risk-
taking activities of financial firms after the crisis, in the third part we analyse changes in 
Italian life insurers’ asset risk profile in the span 2005 – 2011, accounting for the importance 
of effects of bancassurance ventures.  
Through a pooled OLS panel data analysis we test the finite risk hypothesis which predicts a 
negative correlation between asset risk and other firm-specific factors determining the level 
of risk exposure such as bancassurance ventures, product mix, size and product 
diversification. In particular we contribute to the extant literature by considering the effects 
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of the adoption of specific bancassurance models on the level of asset risk. The hypothesis is 
developed relying on two strands of literature: the general literature that investigates the 
relationship between asset risk and capital and on the specific studies dealing with risk 
exposure determined by bancassurance ventures. Finally we test for the effects of external 
macroeconomic shocks (such as the last financial crisis and changes in regulation).  
Our results show that Italian life insurers present a relatively prudent level of exposure, 
which is negatively correlated with firm factors  influencing the overall risk profile. Stronger 
bancassurance models confirm this relationship. Finally, asset risk exposure did not decrease 
significantly as a result of the financial crisis, pointing at the effectiveness of regulatory 
restrictions on investments or a contingent search for yields. 
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A Survey of the literature on Bancassurance  
 
1.Introduction 
 
Since the Nineties, the entry of banks into insurance brought several innovations 
particularly in the life insurance market. Indeed, bank branches have become the main 
distribution channel for life insurance products in several European markets (CEA, 2009). 
Furthermore, looking at the primary market, new products have been developed such as 
unit and index linked policies which, given the high level financial content and 
standardization, can be considered as quasi banking products.  
Several bancassurance models have been developed and coexist within the life insurance 
market such as distribution agreement as well as in the form of ownership linkages (ba nks’ 
captive companies and joint ventures). 
Earlier qualitative studies, focusing on a managerial perspective, consider the advantages of 
various bancassurance models from the banking perspective. According to this view, the 
most successful form of co operation is the one that better suits the bank’s strategic plan 
and idiosyncratic situation (Hoshka, 1994). More recently, Van den Berge et al. (1999) 
consider the phenomenon in a more functionalistic framework aiming to override the same 
bancassurance and assurfinance concepts which are seen as too linked to an institutional 
approach. According to Van den Berghe et al (1999), the choice of the co operation model is 
finally guided by the choices on the distribution side which in turns depends on the 
consumers ‘needs and on external market conditions.  
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On the other side, empirical literature is mainly devoted to test the conglomeration 
hypothesis which holds that more diversified firms are characterized by superior scope 
economies, higher efficiency and lower risk exposure. The main investigated issues concern 
the effects of cross sector M&A on shareholders’ wealth (Staikouras, 2009; Dontis Charitos, 
2011) and on risk reduction (Elyiasiani, 2010; Casu et al, 2011). Several quantitative studies 
also examine the effects of deregulation on competition in the insurance market (Carow, 
2001 and Cummins, 2006) Finally, others examine effect of bancassurance ties on cost and 
profit efficiency as well as on technological progress in the life insurance sector (Fiordelisi 
and Ricci, 2010; Yuan and Phillips, 2008 and Cummins and Turchetti, 1996).  
With respect to the quantitative part, we are aware that the selected papers are not 
exhaustive of the entire literature on bancassurance as we omitted the analysis of pioneer 
works based on simulated M&A1.  Here we consider more recent works that rely on direct 
observation of conglomerates on which the two successive empirical papers presented in 
this dissertation are based.  
The figure below (Figure 1) shows our categorization of the literature on bancassurance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Genetay and Molyneaux, 1998 for a deeper overview  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the last part of our work we evidence a relevant gap: neither theoretical nor quantitative 
literature investigate on why an insurer should prefer a more integrated bancassurance 
partnership and why more integrated forms should be more efficient from the insurers’ 
point of view. 
In order to override this gap in the literature, we suggest an application of the property right 
theoretical framework. This approach has already been applied in order to explain the co - 
existence of several distribution systems and organizational forms within insurance industry 
(Grossman and Hart, 1984 and Tennyson, 1997). We propose to extend this approach 
beyond distribution system and organizational forms to consider the choice of specific 
bancassurance model as linked to the characteristics of unit and index linked products. In 
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this framework we relate the choice of a specific bancassurance model to the optimal level 
of integration needed in order to sell quasi banking products. 
Thus, departing from the investigation of relevant literature on insurance distribution system 
we consider joint ventures as a form of vertical integration and, given the bancassurance 
products characteristics, in accordance with the property right approach, we demonstrate 
that joint ventures are the best model for selling these kinds of product.  
The first section of the paper gives an overview of the main qualitative studies on 
bancassurance focusing both on the causes of the phenomenon and on the examination of 
the various contractual forms. The second section offers a critical survey of recent 
quantitative literature evidencing the main investigated issues and underlining the main 
gaps and uninvestigated issues. The third part deals with studies on insurance distribution 
system focusing on the property right approach, which links specific distribution systems and 
organizational form to the characteristics of the products sold, extending this approach to 
the choice of a specific bancassurance model. In the last section we conclude. 
 
2.Qualitative literature 
The removal of barriers to banks’ entry into the insurance market took place in Europe 
with the Second Banking Directive in 1989 and in the US with the Financial Services 
Modernization Act in 1999. This led to a process of de jure convergence between the bank 
and insurance sectors allowing for several new institutional models of bank-insurance 
ventures. However, the de facto co operation between the two institutions backs its roots 
well before the above mentioned regulation. Indeed, the provision of insurance products by 
banks or lending institutions has been developed in France in the mid Eighties; moreover, as 
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evidenced by Staikouras (2007), since the 1980’s, in Greece, state owned banks  were used as 
a major point for raising awareness of the various insurance products.  
The convergence between bank and insurance is seen as a natural process due to similarities 
linking the activities of the two sectors and to the new orientation of financial institutions 
grouping all financial needs of their costumers instead of focusing on product lines (Genetay 
and Molyneaux, 1998). The similarities are more evident with regard to life insurance as 
these products are very similar from a technical standpoint and are offered either as an 
alternative or as complementary to savings and other investment products sold by banks 
(see Benoist, 2003). This natural process of convergence is reflected into the regulatory 
framework that, from both in Europe and in US the Nineties allowed banks to enter the 
insurance industry. Staikouras (2007) underlines how the de facto and de jure converge 
between the two financial institutions “is a vibrant example where, in regulatory dialectic, 
the political process of regulation and economic forces of avoidance adapt to each other in a 
series of lagged responses”. Several counter arguments can be brought regarding the cost of 
coordination, as will be later highlighted. 
Literature devoted to financial conglomerates holds that, at an idiosyncratic level, the main 
driving force that leads banks to perform insurance is the exploitation of synergies 
connected to the quest for profitability and scope economies. 
Two kinds of scope economies are evidenced: cost scope economies on the production side 
and revenue scope economies on the consumption side (Berger, 1999). Scope economies on 
the production side refer to cost reductions achieved by producing a variety of outputs 
within a single firm rather than having these outputs produced in separated firms. Cost 
economies of scope arise due to shareable inputs, i.e. one input that can be employed for 
the production of several outputs. Revenue scope economies, exist if the firm can earn more 
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by producing several outputs than if the outputs were produced in separate, specialized 
firms.  
In particular, cost scope economies in bancassurance ventures originate from sharing retail 
branches, distribution system, agency network, and asset management know how; revenue 
scope economies can be achieved by banks by expanding the product range to less risky 
activities, thus lowering risk exposure. On the other side, a relevant source of revenue scope 
economies is the “lock in effect”: banks, by providing an integrated product range, raise the 
switching costs increasing costumers’ loyalty, thus reducing the incentive for customers to 
turn to another firm for the same services. Moreover, looking at revenue scope economies, 
a vast literature evidences that consumer may be willing to pay more for the convenience of 
the “supermarket shopping” or “one stop shopping” for their bank and insurance needs as 
this formula lowers their transaction costs and satisfies their need for integrated solutions  
Risk reduction, which can be considered among scope economies, is achieved through 
diversification as risks of banking and insurance are not fully correlated (Hoshcka, 1994). This 
can be seen as a form of revenue scope economy stemming from the diversification of banks 
into less risky activities. 
From a managerial perspective, the theoretical analysis of financial markets and institutions 
can be carried out within either the institutional (Hoshka, 1994) or the functional 
perspective (Van den Berge and Verweire, 2001).  
The institutional perspective takes as given the existing institutional structures of financial 
intermediaries and views the objective of public policy as helping the survival of these 
institutions. In contrast, a functional perspective is one based on the services provided by 
the financial system, such as providing a way to transfer economic resources through time.  
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The functional perspective takes as given the economic functions performed by financial 
intermediaries and asks what the best institutional structure to perform these functions is. 
The theory relies on two premises:  
- Financial functions are more stable than financial institutions  
- Institutional form follows function 
The financial services may be packaged differently both across competitive institutions and 
over time, but the functions are far more stable (Oldfield and Santomero, 1995). When 
studying the financial system, functions  are the anchors and are exogenously determined, 
while institutions are endogenously determined.  
In the next two paragraphs we categorize the relevant qualitative studies specifically 
devoted to bancassurance into these two perspectives. 
 
2.1 Institutional perspective 
Earlier studies are concerned with the issue of banks’ activities diversification into the 
insurance market adopting a bank centered approach (see Hoshcka, 1994 and Genetay and 
Moulineaux, 1998) by focusing on the incentives and reasons for banks entering the 
insurance market. More recently, advantages for insurers have been evidenced (see 
Staikouras, 2006 and 2007 and Benoist, 2003).  
From the insurers’ point of view, Staikouras (2007) evidences how scale economies are 
pursued by insurers in order to reduce operating costs and increasing market supply through 
the use of bank branches, while the quest for economies of scale are considered by Hoshcka 
(1994) as a minor issue from the banks’ point of view.  
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The analysis of the interface of bank and insurance also encompasses the costs and 
disadvantages of co operation between different institutions which are mainly linked to 
conflicts arising from different corporate cultures that can lead to scope diseconomies.  
Hoshcka (1994) and Staikouras (2006) evidence the existence of different cultures 
characterizing banks and insurance. In this respect, insurers are more sales oriented while 
banks act as counsellors for their clients . Frictions can stem from different philosophies and 
behaviours both at corporate and retail level.  
Benoist (2003) also evidences the risks and vulnerabilities associated with both 
bancassurance and assurfinance models. Dangers for banks distributing insurance products 
are linked to image risk, since lack of control over the handling of claims and possible delays 
in paying out settlements can damage a bank’s image and relations with clients. Other risks 
concern cannibalization and costs associated to training sales force especially for selling non 
life insurance products. Moreover rivalries can arise among distribution networks (insurance 
agencies and bank branches). 
This strand of literature looks at the existence of various forms of co operation as driven by 
the need of banks to adapt to changing financial environment and at the same time to 
minimize the costs arising from different strategic and operational approaches.  
Hoshka (1994) goes in deep in the analysis of the various legal form of co operation 
identifying and analyzing four banks entry modes into insurance on the basis of the level of 
integration. The next figure  as depicted in the next figure (figure 2). 
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Figure 2 
 
 
      Figure 1 
 
In order to identify the possible corporate drivers that distinguish one business venture from 
another in terms of being successful, Hoshka (1994) focuses essentially on idiosyncratic 
dynamics as the success of the mode of entry depends basically on strategic and operational 
factors.  
Accordingly, in order for a bank to develop a successful strategic plan for entering the 
insurance market, the first step is to estimate the costumers’ needs. Then from the analysis 
of customer needs will descend the further steps: the strategic positioning, the choice of 
information technology support and of distribution approach. Finally training of employees 
and incentive structures (i.e. the compensation system for branch employees and insurers 
counsellors in selling insurance) must be functionally adapted into the strategic plan.  The 
most successful mode of entry will be the one that best fits the strategic plan and allows the 
greatest degree of flexibility and integration among bank and insurance activities and 
corporate cultures.  
In this framework, exogenous factors are included into the analysis of costumers’ needs that 
are at the basis of the strategic plan. 
Hoschka considers two major issues in order to choose the best mode of entry: (i) the 
acquisition of know how in developing and selling insurance products and (ii) conflic ts 
stemming from the diversity of insurers and banks corporate culture as insurers are 
traditionally sales and commissions driven while banks are less sales -oriented, mainly 
De novo entry 
M&A 
Joint ventures 
Co operative distribution alliances 
Integration level 
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providing a counselling service to customers. The optimal choice of the entry mode is 
characterized by a trade off between a fast acquisition of know how (which is best achieved 
through distribution agreement, joint ventures and M&A) and avoidance of frictions due to 
the different corporate cultures (which is best achieved through de novo entry). 
According to Hoshka the most successful model is “de novo entry” as it allows the highest 
degree of strategic flexibility, implying that in this way banks are able to design a tailored 
entry strategy into insurance which best suits specific competitive environment and internal 
structure, avoiding conflicts at corporate level arising from the combination of different 
cultures, strategies and management styles. The disadvantages can arise from the initial lack 
of know-how as managers start low on the learning curve. One way to reduce problems 
stemming from lack of know how could be the recruitment of experienced personnel. 
Hoshka, on the basis of the distribution approach emerging from several case studies also 
hypothesizes an evolution in term of product complexity offered by de novo entering banks. 
Indeed, initially these institutions choose simple insurance product that do not require 
specialized skills and that can be distributed by bank branch employees; subsequently as 
know how is acquired, these institution opt for a more sophisticated product range 
designated by specialized insurance product counsellors. Thus, this model turns out to be 
flexible in designing new products and tailoring products and distribution approach towards 
the specific situation of the bank. 
Strategic alliances are seen as the least successful mode of entry. According to Hoshka, two 
are the main sources of problems: the instability of long term contracts that leads to 
opportunistic behaviours and the divergence of strategic intents of the bank and insurance 
partners. Indeed, as underlined above, traditionally insurers are sales oriented while banks 
are more counselling oriented. In this respect, strategic intents may diverge as insurers 
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traditionally tend to maximize the sales of products with high commissions while banks may 
stress that branch employees should tailor their sales recommendations to the costumer’s 
specific needs in order to secure long term costumer relationship. The co operative alliances 
are usually more advantageous for insurers, as they can enjoy the banks’ comparative 
advantage in distribution due to a higher frequency of customer interaction and the 
perception of banks as financial counsellors acting in the costumer’s best interest.  
Regarding joint ventures, the advantage over the co operative alliances is a clearer 
organization structure and a well defined incentive scheme. The joint venture is not a stable 
organization, usually, banks tend to chose these structures in order to acquire know how 
faster. After acquiring know-how banks tend to increase their stake ending up with the 
acquisition. 
Finally mergers and acquisitions provide the potential to combine banks and insurers’ know 
how. The disadvantages regard the possible frictions at the board and at the branch levels 
arising from the two different corporate cultures. At the management levels the board may 
spend time and effort bargaining on power position and strategic intents. At the branch level 
there can be issues regarding the different compensation system concerning the bank and 
insurance personnel as bank employees work on salary basis while insurers are commission 
oriented. 
According to Santomero and Dean (1993) banks would prefer to own insurers in order to 
access to the founding base associated with deferred liabilities and in order to report on a 
clear consolidated basis for all product owned and distributed through their network.  
Falautano and Marsiglia (2003) see the integration models proposed by Hoshka in an 
evolutionary framework. The development of the various bancassurance corporate forms is 
seen in a diachronic framework hypothesizing that the models range from the loosest entry 
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adopted during the first stages of bancassurance to synergies involving the acquisition by 
banks of the entire production and distribution cycle. 
 
 
2.2 Functional perspective 
As already evidenced, the functional perspective is well suited for analyzing the dynamic 
and changing environment of financial system, as the functions of the financial system are 
considered far more stable than the identity and structure of the institutions performing 
them.  
Van den Berge et al. (1998, 1999 and 2000) look at bancassurance from a pure functionalistic 
view instead of concentrating on institution advantages. As evidenced by the authors, the 
same concept of bancassurance which is defined as the provision by banks of insurance 
services, is not completely disentangled from an institutional framework. Indeed Van den 
Berge et al (1999, 2000) try to override the bancassurance and assurfinance concepts with 
the concept of all finance, which is completely disentangled from the traditional and 
institutional definitions of the banking and insurance products and strategies. 
The authors distinguish between the concepts of assurfinance i.e. the strategy where an 
insurance company or intermediary cross sells financial products and bancassurance i.e. the 
strategy of banks to cross sell insurance products through its own distribution channels. 
Their approach aims at overriding these concepts which are seen as too narrow for an in 
depth analysis of the convergence process in the financial industry. The definition of 
bancassurance and assurfinance indeed stems from the traditional definitions of most 
financial and insurance services which are based on technical criteria and institutional sector 
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barriers. In order to develop an analysis of the convergence in the financial markets, Van den 
Berghe et al. (1999) start from the point that the real market needs are often not in 
accordance with these traditional concepts. They argue that “the growing convergence in the 
financial services industry is taking place because financial institutions reconsider their core 
business and come up with appropriate strategic answers. One of these answers is what we 
call "all finance"” (Ibidem, p.20). All finance refers to a product and market-oriented 
approach in considering financial products and is considered as the highest form of 
integration between financial services. Through the concept of “all finance” the authors 
override previous studies that considered the convergence process from the point of view of 
the different institutions either banks or insurers. By stressing the importance for financial 
conglomerates to redefine the core business and primary activities of f inancial institutions 
from a technical (product) point of view to a client oriented (functional) approach, this 
framework overrides the previous studies on integration both in term of retail and in terms 
of product development. In terms of retail, Van den Berghe et al (1999) envisage an 
integrated distribution system where costumers are free to select the distribution channel 
they want within the same financial conglomerate, either the banks or insurers according to 
their needs. In terms of product development, according to the all finance approach, 
“products produced in different ’factories’ are unbundled and rebundled to tailor them to the 
needs of specific client segments in order to offer them an integrated personalized solution” 
(Ibidem, p. 24). In this framework, bancassurance and assurfinance, referring only to cross 
selling strategies, are considered as the lowest form of integration, while, through all 
finance, institutions move towards fully integrated services. The all finance approach at the 
production and primary activities side leads to integration at the level of support activities. 
Support activities are corporate governance, capital policy and IT. Accordingly, legal, capital 
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and organizational structures are created in order to support the primary and support 
activities. New organizational structures are created that override the limits posed by 
legislation which does not allow for a full integration of banks and insurance. In order to 
better understand the functionalistic approach and the leading role of the all finance 
concept within the convergence process, the authors develop a scheme which is called the 
Corporate Control Board, which is illustrated in the next figure. 
Figure 3 
 
The front arrow depicts the primary activities which must be developed within the all 
finance approach. The choice of integration of primary activities leads the choice of the 
integration level of the support activities. Following, the structural factors that lie on the 
back of the figure must be adapted. In this framework, the choice of legal, capital and 
organizational structure, thus the choice of the co operation model, will be driven by the 
distributional choice. 
 
3.Empirical studies 
A wide literature exists on financial conglomerates that focuses on benefits and costs of 
diversification in non – interest income for financial holding companies as well as on the 
benefit for insurers to operate both in the life and non life markets. Vander Vennet (2000) 
finds that, in terms of cost efficiency, specialized banks appear to exhibit no disadvantage 
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relative to financial conglomerates in traditional intermediation activities When looking at 
non traditional banking activities, conglomerates are on average more cost and profit 
efficient than non universal institutions. In term of scale efficiency, small banks exhibit 
unexploited scale economies, while for universal banks and conglomerates no scale benefits 
or advantages have been found. On the contrary, Stiroh (2005), looking at US for the years 
1997 – 2002, finds that diversification gains are more than offset by the costs of increased 
exposure to volatility that characterizes non - interest income activities. Finally, looking at 
insurers diversification into several activities, Cummins et al (2010), considering the US Life -
Health insurance market from 1993 to 2006, indicate that strategically focused firms (i.e. 
firms that do not diversify into property-liability activities) are significantly more efficient for 
all types of efficiency except for scale efficiency, thus results clearly indicate that there are 
clear diseconomies of scope in life insurance.  
Here we deepen the analysis of a sub sector of the literature on financial conglomeration 
considering specific bancassurance ventures. 
Quantitative literature dealing specifically with bancassurance is relatively recent and 
departs from studies on banks’ diversification into non banking activities or from the more 
general literature on financial conglomerates. In our overview, we partially follow the 
classification proposed by Ricci (2012) considering the more recent results. 
Among empirical studies we can distinguish three major issues:  
- the first encompasses the determinants of value creation of bancassurance in terms 
of profitability for shareholder and in terms of profit and cost efficiency for 
institutions,  
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- the second focuses on risk profiles of aggregations between banks and insurers, finally  
- the third strand attempts to answer questions about the effect of deregulation on 
competition.  
Following we go in depth in the analysis of the most recent studies devoted to the three 
abovementioned research areas. 
 
3.1. Profitability for shareholders, cost economies and efficiency 
The first issue analyzed by quantitative literature devoted to financial conglomerates and 
bancassurance is the quest for profitability, cost economies and efficiency as the main 
leading force for bancassurance mergers.  
The two main hypotheses that are tested within this research area are the conglomeration 
hypothesis and the strategic focus hypothesis (see Berger et al., 1996). The conglomeration 
hypothesis holds that owning and operating a broad range of businesses may add value 
either from exploiting cost scope economies by sharing inputs in joint production or taking 
advantage of revenue scope economies enhancing profitability. According to the 
conglomeration hypothesis, conglomerates in the financial sector can achieve cost scope 
economies by sharing information of a large costumers’ base and by sharing distribution 
channels, risk management techniques or IT resources. Revenue scope economies can also 
be achieved through consumption complementarities as costumers may be willing to pay 
more for the convenience of the “supermarket shopping” for their bank and insurance needs 
as this formula lowers their transaction costs. In contrast, the strategic focus hypothesis 
holds that firms can maximize value by focusing on core businesses and core competencies.  
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Two are the main quantitative methodologies adopted in this research field: the event study 
approach, based on the analysis of stock returns response to M&A across financial 
institutions and the analysis of cost and profit efficiency at the firm level through statistic 
and mathematic programming approaches. 
Following we analyze recent studies dealing with the abovementioned approaches. 
3.1.1 Event studies 
The event study analysis relies on the assumption that any change in the expected 
economic profit of an industry is immediately incorporated in firm stock prices (Fama and 
MacBeth, 1973). If bancassurance M&A result in a reduction or enhancement of future cash 
flows for the involved institutions, the expectation will be reflected by stock value on the 
date of the announcement.  
Accordingly event studies analyze stock returns of institution involved in bancas surance 
M&A around the operations’ announcement date in order to find out significant market 
responses in terms of abnormal returns. Thus the methodology aims to unveil whether bank-
insurance initiatives (mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures etc.) trigger trading movements 
that significantly affect stock prices and consequently equity returns of the involved 
institutions.  
Conglomeration hypothesis holds if substantial positive abnormal returns are found around 
the announcement date.  
Considering recent studies, Staikouras et al (2009), for a global sample of bancassurance 
deals involving mainly European and North American countries between 1990 and 2006, find 
out that M&A announcements lead to positive market reactions around the event days and 
create wealth for stockholders of banks bidding. The abnormal returns turn out to be 
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statistically significant for banks bidders, while it seems that insurer bidders are not 
positively affected by bancassurance activities.  
The determinants of eventual abnormal returns are modeled as functions of the bidder’s 
characteristics and deal-specific factors in order to find out the main drivers of value 
creation. This is done through a regression analysis with the abnormal returns as dependent 
variables and a number of deal’s characteristics simultaneously considered as independent 
variables. Looking at the determinant of value creation, Staikouras et al (2009) identify 
profitability (measured by ROE) and size of the deal (relative size of the target) as the major 
determinants of value creation, while abnormal returns and functional diversification (non 
interest income as a percentage of total operating income) exhibits a negative relationship. 
Thus results show that it is not diversification per se which leads to wealth enhancement. 
Indeed, intrinsic characteristics of the institutions such as the profitability of the bidder and 
the size of the target seem to be the major determinants of the positive market reactions.  
Dontis Charitos et al (2011) also look at all available bancassurance deals (including 
insurance agency targets) occurring in 1990 – 2006 separating the sample on the basis of the 
sector of the acquiring firm in order to shade light on possible different effects of deals on 
either banks or insurers bidder. A control sample is included which encompass major public 
deals where one of the counterparts is either a bank or an insurer. Among value drivers 
geographic diversification and different culture are included. Results are consistent with 
Staikouras (2009) showing positive abnormal returns for bank bidders and though 
insignificant or negative abnormal returns for insurers.  
Dontis Charitos et al (2011) also find that larger banks are positively affected when acquiring 
insurer targets as the deal’s size relative to the bidder market value positively affects 
abnormal return throughout the event window, while geographic diversification is negatively 
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related to abnormal returns. Consistently, Leaven and Levine (IMF, 2012) find that 
geographic diversification is value destroying for bank holding companies due to enhanced 
complexity in monitoring firms executives for shareholders and creditors. 
Elyasiani (2010) looks at a sample of major international bancassurance deals with public 
banks as bidders and insurers as targets in the period 1990 – 2006. Their findings show 
positive abnormal returns throughout the event window implying positive wealth effects for 
bank bidders. Looking at the determinants of value creation, the analysis does not reveal a 
significant role for the market to book value, profitability, geographic diversification, or 
activity diversification (non-interest income ratio). 
 
3.1.2 Micro – econometric studies 
On the other side, the micro - econometric approach looks at empirically testing the 
existence of scope economies or higher efficiency level in financial conglomerates relying on 
estimates of cost, revenue and profit function calculating scores for scope economies based 
on estimated value of economic functions. Others rely on efficiency frontiers methodologies 
and look for differences in cost, profit and scale efficiency across institution that show 
different level of diversification or different levels of involvement in bancassurance 
operations.  
Thus, for a given technology, the conglomeration hypothesis is satisfied when diversified 
firms show positive scope economies scores or operate with a higher level of efficiency with 
respect to their more specialized counterparts.  
Looking at studies that adopt the micro econometric approach we consider Yuan and Philips 
(2008) for the U.S. insurance sector and Fiordelisi and Ricci (2010) for the Italian life 
insurance industry. 
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Yuan and Philips (2008) carry out the first study that analyses cost and revenue scope 
economies arising from bancassurance in the US through a cost and profit function in order 
to assess if universal type organization override their specialized peers exploiting scope 
economies. The data sample ranges over the period 2003 – 2005, and identify financial 
conglomerates and all the licensed subsidiaries: commercial banks, thrift or insurance 
companies. The dataset comprises 260 observations of diversified firms jointly producing 
banking and insurance products, 613 insurance specialists and 1450 bank specialists.. 
A cost function is estimated for banks subsidiaries, insurance subsidiaries and joint 
producers, thus considering that these firms employ different production technologies. 
Accordingly, three outputs are considered: banking, life-health insurance and property 
liability insurance. Input and input prices are also considered separately for the three 
sectors. Then cost (revenue,) economies are measured as the percentage of costs (revenue) 
that firms could save (increase) by producing multiple output jointly instead of producing 
separately. To calculate cost, revenue and profit scope economies the values of the 
respective functions at the output and input prices median are considered. The critic value is 
given by the value of the function for the  specialist less the value of the function for 
divisions of joint producers divided by the value for joint producers. Scope economies are 
present if the values are positive, while diseconomies are present if the value is negative. 
Scope economies estimates are then regressed on specific firm characteristics such as size, 
the weight of banking activities for conglomerates, the range of insurance and banking 
activities performed by conglomerates and distribution channels.  
The results are in favour of conglomeration hypothesis. In particular, for joint producers 
consumption complementarities can be observed (one stop shopping). Small firms are more 
likely to benefit from cost saving by sharing important or costly resources in conglomeration 
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(exploitation of scale and cost scope economies) while large firms are more likely to benefit 
from revenue and profit increases when jointly producing banking and insurance products. 
Traditional banking firms are more profit scope efficient when conducting simultaneously 
both life and PL insurance business, thus it seems that, for the US market, diversification of 
banks into all insurance business is cost efficiency enhancing. Finally the degree of 
integration of distribution system has no effect on scope economies among conglomerates.  
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2010) analyze the effect of bancassurance on efficiency in the Italian life 
insurance market in the years 2005 and 2006 employing s stochastic frontier methodology. 
The analysis aims at unveiling if, among insurers, those participated by banks show an higher 
level of profit and cost efficiency with respect to their independent peers. Accordingly, the 
sample of insurers is divided into three groups on the basis of banks equity participation, and 
a common frontier is estimated for all the three groups. The groups are sorted as: insurers 
that are not participated by banks (independent insurers), insurers totally owned by banks 
and joint ventures Two specifications are adopted: a base model and a model that considers 
firms specific factors. The base model grasps determinants of firms performance linked to 
pure managerial ability in combining production factors. The specification of a frontier 
including firms specific factors allows for an in depth explanation of differences in efficiency 
across groups considering the impact of the distribution through bank branches, the 
financial contents of products sold, the market share and the product diversification. The 
base model (that does not consider specific factor into the frontier) show models difference 
in cost efficiency in favor of joint ventures and no differences in profit efficiency. The results 
for the extended model clearly show significant differences in cost efficiency in favor of 
bancassurers with respect tot. the independent peers. The success of bancassurance in 
terms of cost efficiency is explained by a high share of premiums collected through bank 
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branches and the high level of financial content of the products sold. When looking at profit 
efficiency, joint ventures significantly under perform both insurers controlled by banks and 
independent insurers. The results show that the specialization in high financial content 
products is negatively related to profit efficiency. This in turn implies that the hypothesis of 
revenue scope economies does not hold.  
The significant difference in profit efficiency across bancassurance models is thus explained 
by product characteristic and distribution channel. Indeed policies with high financial 
contents are usually considered as more standardized. Joint ventures into the Italian life 
insurance market in 2005 and 2006 were mainly involved in the class III policies market. 
Class III policies are less risky products as the insured directly bears the risk of investment, as 
the return of these kind of policies is linked to either investment funds, stock indexes or to 
specific stocks, whilst the insurers bears only the demographic risk., as the insurance service 
must be related to the human life duration. The distribution of these policies is strongly 
affected by various phases of capital markets which in these years undergone a less euphoric 
phase. 
We point out that this is the first study that analyzes the costs and benefits resulting from 
the adoption of a specific bancassurance model from the insurers’ point of view. 
Nevertheless, cost and profit efficiency differences across models are found to be dependent 
upon firms’ characteristics that are not specific to bancassurers, such as distribution through 
bank branches and production of unit and index linked products. Indeed, independent 
insurers also engage into cross selling agreements for bank branches distribution and are 
involved in the unit and index linked market. So why an insurer should prefer to engage in 
joint ventures with banks instead of relying on flexible distribution agreements? The 
question remain still open. 
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3.2 The effect of bancassurance deals on risk exposure of involved institutions  
As already mentioned, the quest for risk exposure reduction is seen as one of the main 
motivation of banks entry into the insurance sector.  
In particular the risk measures derive from the variance of stock returns around the M&A’s 
announcement date also adopting risk decomposition techniques such as Generalized Auto-
Regressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic (GARCH) asset pricing model in order to 
decompose total risk in its main components: systematic and idiosyncratic risk. 
Recent results show mixed evidence about the reduction of systematic and idiosyncratic risk 
exposure (Elyasiani et al, 2010; Casu et al., 2011), although there is agreement tha t the 
increasing scale of bank operations should not be an advantage in this sense as it increases 
banks’ systematic risk.  
Elysiani and Staikouras (2010), looking at international deals that involve banks as acquiring 
firms between 1990 and 2006, through Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditionally 
Heteroskedastic (GARCH) asset pricing model, decompose total risk into its systematic and 
idiosyncratic components, finding a decline in the overall risk exposure for bank bidders. 
Looking at the separate components of the total risk, they find that reduction is driven by 
the decline in exposure to unsystematic risk while there is not a substantial drop in 
systematic risk. This is interpreted as a consequence of the increased market share of 
financial conglomerates in the total market basket: indeed the relative importance of market 
risk increases in the post deal period as M&A operation bring these institutions closer to the 
large firm index, thus increasing their market risk exposure and their co movements with the  
overall market.  
A recent study by Casu et al (2011), employing a risk decomposition technique, analyzes an 
international sample of deals involving banks, insurers and insurance agencies for the period 
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1990 – 2006. One of the more interesting features of this work is that results are tested on 
the basis of the nature of the bidder (bank or insurer) which turns out to be a relevant 
variable in order to determine the risk profile of the conglomerates. Results on the overall 
sample indicate no significant effect on the total risk. Nonetheless, the importance of the 
components of total risk, which are systematic and idiosyncratic risks, is found to change 
after the deal announcement depending on the nature of the bidder. Indeed the analysis 
provides evidence of an increasing exposure of banks bidders to systematic risk and a 
decreasing idiosyncratic risk following a bancassurance partnership, although results turn 
out to be statistically significative only when the target is an insurance agency. On the 
contrary, the insurer bidders are subjected to a drop in systematic risk and a rise in 
idiosyncratic risk exposure.  
The study also looks for the determinants of risk exposure by regressing the indicators for 
risks on firms’ specific characteristics of the bidders such as product diversification, loan risk, 
profitability, leverage and size. 
Looking at specific determinants of risk, Casu et al (2011) find out that the raise of 
systematic risk for banks is not driven by diversification into insurance activities but ra ther 
by the increasing scale of bank operations. On the other side, diversification is not found to 
significantly affect banks exposure to idiosyncratic risk after the announcement, while size 
seems to have a negative effect on idiosyncratic risk both pre and post deal announcement, 
consistently with the hypothesis of scale and scope economies.  
Overall, Casu et al (2011) suggest that bancassurance offers banks opportunities to 
rebalance risk exposure sheltering from idiosyncratic risk but at the same time facing a 
higher systematic risk. 
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3.3 Effect of bancassurance into competition in the life insurance market 
Another issue investigated by quantitative studies is how deregulation affects 
competition into insurance industry. In this context the entrance of banks can be considered 
as a removal of entry barrier that may increase competition and reduce economic rent for 
incumbent insurers and agency networks. Increased competition and spread reduction entail 
insignificant long-run economic rents for banks entering the insurance industry which may 
force incumbent insurers to lower their earning spread (Carow, 2001 and Cummins, 2006).  
These dynamics are reflected and incorporated into the value of company stocks at 
deregulation announcement date. Analysis of the effect of competition brought by banks 
‘entrance into insurance industry are based on U.S. data and rely on event studies and look 
at difference in stock returns of banks and insurers around the announcement date of 
deregulation.  
Carow (2001) analyzes the effect of regulation allowing bank to sell insurance products 
before the GLBA Act of 1999 which allowed for mergers between banks and insurance 
underwriters. Indeed, since the mid Eighties six provisions were ruled by Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and Supreme Court that allowed banks to sell various 
insurance products. The analysis focuses on the value of banks’ and insurers’ stock returns 
around the announcement dates of deregulation that range from 1984 to 1996. Results 
show a loss in insurers’ value and no effect on banks’ value. Results are explained within the 
contestable market theory. Thus results are consistent with contestable market theory as 
the fall of barriers to bank entry into insurance market is perceived by stockholders as 
reducing insurers’ value as a consequence of enhanced competition and reduced long term 
earnings.  
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Carow (2001) also regards at the effect as dependent upon distribution system and product 
segment (life or P-L). Considering that in the analyzed years banks can only distribute 
insurance products and are expected to sell annuities underwritten by insurance companies. 
Thus banks are expected to be direct competitors with subsidiary insurance agencies, 
affecting insurers that distribute directly through subsidiaries. Accordingly, results show that 
companies with insurance agencies are negatively affected by deregulation while the effect 
is moderate on insurers relying on brokerage (not direct) distribution system.  
At the same time, product specialization of insurers into either life or P-L seems to be a 
relevant characteristic in order to assess the effect of banks’ competition. Indeed, given the 
similarities of life insurance policies to banking products, life insurers are more threatened 
by competition and this is revealed by lower returns of life insurers.   
Cummins (2006) analyses the effect of bank entry into the insurance intermediary 
(distribution) industry in the US. The considered span ranges from 1995 to 2005 as since 
1999 US regulation allowed banks to di rectly underwrite insurance. The bank entry is 
considered by Cummins as a shock that led to a series of M&A in the agency/brokerage 
industry. Indeed, intermediary market has undergone a major restructure in the nineties in 
response to the increasing number of bank owned agencies. Following, insurance companies 
face competition both by banks and by the increased bargaining power of insurance 
intermediaries through M&A. The response of insurance companies has been a diffuse 
internalization of distribution costs. Cummins (2006) also finds out that consolidation has 
positive wealth effects especially for shareholders of banks that pursue bancassurance 
strategies. The wealth effects of M&A between banks and P-L insurance agency/brokers 
generate higher abnormal returns than the acquisition of life – health insurance 
agency/brokers. The acquisition by banks of P-L insurance intermediaries is perceived as 
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value enhancing because P-L products deserve a more specialist insurance know how, while 
the affinity of L-H investment products with the traditional bank products permits banks to 
directly sell this kind of products. On reverse, vertical integration for P-L insurers is rather 
seen as a mere defense strategy to deal with the increased bargaining power of the 
intermediaries, thus it is perceived as not providing significant wealth gains to shareholders.  
This is consistent with more recent studies that find negative correlation between the banks 
and insurers’ stock returns at the time of the bank-insurance M&A announcements (Dontis 
Charitos, Molyneux and Staikouras, 2011 and Staikouras,2009). According to the contestable 
market theory, in particular looking at the insurance industry, the stock market perceives the 
entrance of new structure into the business arena as reducing the long-term profits of the 
existing firms. In this framework, bancassurance could inject more competition into the 
insurance business and divert premium cash flows to banks. 
The entrance of banks into insurance market have brought several innovatio ns that affected 
the technology and productivity of the insurance industry.  
 In this respect Cummins, Turchetti and Weiss (1996) carry out a pioneer study which, 
applying micro econometric methodologies, analyses the bancassurance phenomenon in the 
Italian insurance market. The analysis raises the issue of bancassurance as part of the 
technological changes investing the Italian insurance industry in the Nineties. The focus is on 
technical efficiency, changes in technical efficiency over time, technical change, as well as 
productivity growth over time for a sample of Italian insurers for the period 1985 – 1993.  To 
shade light on the effects of changes on productivity and efficiency, the study, conducted 
through a mathematical programming methodology, tests hypotheses about the coexistence 
of alternative distribution systems and organizational forms within the industry. Results 
show no efficiency changes over the span, as well as a significant decline in productivity, 
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attributable to technological regress (i.e. insurers needing more inputs to produce the same 
level of output). The technological regress characterizing the whole Italian insurance market 
during the end of the Eighties and the Nineties is tied to the dynamically changing 
environment that characterized the considered period. During this span, the Italian 
insurance industry has undergone major changes: in particular, since 1990, when banks were 
allowed to own controlling interests in insurers, and this could be considered as an external 
shock that hit the structure of insurance industry. Indeed, large declines in productivity and 
technological regress occurred in the years affected by deregulation process (i.e. 1990 to 
1993): thus, from this study emerges that deregulation and bank entry into the insurance 
industry negatively affected the whole industry. This  can be related to wrong technological 
choices. It is interesting to note how results differ when only the motor insurance industry is 
taken into consideration (Turchetti and Daraio, 2004). Indeed Italian motor insurers, which 
were not significantly affected by bank access into the market, did not experience strong 
variations either in the efficiency change dimension or in the technological change 
dimension during the period 1982 - 1993.  
Given that the bank access into insurance industry hit in particular life insurance industry, 
it can be inferred that this has in fact been an important determinant of technological 
change within Italian insurance industry.  
 
4. Gaps in the existing literature and proposal for further research 
The co existence of several bancassurance models has been raised by the qualitative 
literature. The analysis of bancassurance ventures in this respect is carried out from a 
banking perspective (Hoshka, 1984) or from a pure functionalistic perspective (Van den 
Berghe et al, 1999). Empirical research based on event studies does not consider distribution 
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agreements and does not divide the operation in order to distinguish across different 
models. Moreover, specific empirical studies  dealing with difference in efficiency across 
various models in the Italian life insurance market, find that efficiency is not given by 
managerial skills of the specific venture. Indeed, firm characteristics such as distribution 
through bank branches and production of quasi banking policies do not pertain only to 
bancassurers, since either independent insurers distribute through bank branches and are 
involved in unit and index linked policies production. Thus, there are no specific studies 
dealing on why an insurer should prefer a higher integration level rather than a simple 
distribution agreement. 
Following we analyze this issue relying on the literature devoted to the choice of the optimal 
distribution system and organizational form.  
 
4.1 Earlier literature dealing with insurance distribution systems 
Academic literature that deals with insurance distribution systems is mainly focused on 
the U.S property liability market. Basically, distribution systems can be categorized into two 
types: direct writing and independent agents. Direct writing encompasses exclusive agents 
or insurers own selling workforce and can be considered as a form of vertical integration. 
Independent agency encompasses agents and brokers that represent multiple insurers and 
act independently in delivering clients and assessing risk. Literature on this topic is 
concerned with finding explanation of the co existence of these two systems. 
Pioneer empirical studies departed from the study of costs differences between the two 
systems finding out that insurers working with independent agent incur much higher costs 
than vertically integrated insurers (Joskow, 1973; Cummins and VanDerhei, 1979). Earlier 
explanations of the survival of a cost inefficient system rely on the existence of market 
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imperfections. Nevertheless, this explanation, which is referred to as the market 
imperfection hypothesis, does not grasp the underneath causes of the coexistence of the two 
forms of distribution in the long run.  
In order to override the market imperfection approach, an alternative hypothesis has been 
developed: the product quality hypothesis which, relying on the tradeoff between cost 
efficiency and product quality, states that higher costs of independent agency reflect a 
higher product quality (Barrese, Doerpinghaus and Nelson, 1995), greater services intensity 
and reduction of search costs for costumers (Regan and Tennyson, 1996).  
Since the end of the Nineties, empirical studies that dealt with the issue mainly tried to find 
a relationship between costs data and product quality. The major limit of this type of studies 
is that product quality is relatively unobservable by researchers. Since 1997, the limit has 
been overridden through the examination of differences in efficiency between the two types 
of insurers through frontiers methodologies (see Berger et al., 1997). 
Berger et al (1997) investigate both cost and profit efficiency through SFA analysis in the US 
property liability insurance industry in the period 1981 - 1990. The analysis of profit 
efficiency permits to control for differences in expenditures on service quality for which the 
firm is compensated on the revenue side, thus bringing to light how higher costs may be 
compensated by higher revenues. The analysis is carried out by comparing average efficiency 
between direct and indirect integrated insurers. Moreover, the hypotheses are tested by 
regressing cost and profit inefficiency on several firm characteristics. In this way the effect of 
distribution system on cost and profit inefficiency is isolated from other characteristics such 
as organizational form, business mix and size. Although independent agency insurers are 
found to be less cost efficient on average, difference in profit inefficiency is found to be not 
statistically significant on average. The same results are obtained testing the hypothesis 
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through regression analysis. Differences in cost inefficiency between the two groups appear 
to be statistically significant, but looking at profit inefficiency the difference is much smaller 
and statistically not significant. The results support the product quality hypothesis. Indeed, 
the difference in measured cost inefficiency appear to reflect unmeasured difference in 
product quality, thus cost difference among insurers are mostly attributable to services 
differences rather than to inefficiency and therefore do not represent social costs. 
Trigo Gamarra and Growitsch (2012) extend the analysis to multichannel insurers, which 
exploit both independent agents and exclusive agents to single channel insurers, employing 
just one of the two distribution systems. In their study of the German life insurance market 
in the period 1997 – 2005 they compare cost profit and scale efficiency of multichannel and 
single channel insurers. The hypothesis is that insurers employing a multichannel 
distribution system are overridden in terms of cost efficiency by direct writers and in terms 
of profit efficiency by insurers employing independent agency. Advancing the product 
quality hypothesis, the authors hypothesize that independent agency system, albeit less cost 
efficient, recoup the disadvantage in terms of cost efficiency with higher revenues resulting 
from higher service quality. The results clearly contradict the initial hypothesis, clearly 
indicating that the multichannel strategy override the direct writing in cost efficiency and at 
the same time overrides independent agency in service superiority. In particular, in the 
German life insurance market, direct writers have not reached their optimal size to exploit 
their cost advantage. This is partly due to product distribution strategies. Indeed, while 
multichannel strategies are utilized to sell several products which can be either counseling 
intensive or standardized, direct writing strategy is well suited only for standardized 
products.  
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4.2 Long run equilibrium: the property right approach to the choice of optimal distribution 
system  
Grossman and Hart (1986) analyze the choice of direct writing or independent agents in a 
property right approach. Grossman and Hart approach aims at determine the optimal initial 
contractual relationship between two firms, given the range of possible circumstances that 
can arise subsequently. The specific circumstances that can arise after signing a contract are 
not known at the time the contract is signed, thus the future production decisions and 
investments which are not foreseeable are referred to as noncontractibles. The expected 
distribution of profit that the two firms gain from the initial contract may be affected by 
circumstances arising from new production choice and investments. Thus in this framework, 
the optimal initial contractual relationship is the one that minimize the effect of 
noncontractibles on the distribution of final gains.  
The initial investment choice defining a contractual relationship between insurers and 
distributor relates to the ownership of one specific asset: the list of policyholder, for sake of 
simplicity, now on we will call this choice “the initial investment choice”. In this respect, the 
choice of direct writing and dependent agents entails that insurance company owns the list 
of policyholders, while the choice of independent agents or brokers entails that the insurer 
does not own the list. The final gain is related both to insurer’s profit and to the 
compensation of agents. This in turns depends upon an ex ante unobservable variable: the 
effort of the agent to acquiring and keeping clients. An agent that works well and raises 
insurer’s profits is an agent that gets renewal of policies. In order to induce to spend effort in 
policy renewal, the insurance company will give the agent an initial commission somewhat 
  
 
40 
lower than the acquisition cost of a client but renewal commissions that are in excess of the 
agent’s servicing costs associated with obtaining renewal , this is called a back loaded 
commission structure. Noncontractibles refer to opportunistic behaviors and actions taken 
by the two parties, given the initial investment choice, can affect the final commissions (i.e. 
the profit of agents) as well as the effort of agents in delivering good clients (i.e. the profit of 
company). The range of these possible actions is known by both parties. 
Consequently, the authors individuate two kinds of noncontractibles :(1) noncontractibles 
that can hurt the agent if the company owns the list and (2) noncontractibles that can hurt 
the company if the agent owns the list. Type (1) relate to insurer making the product it is 
selling less competitive, making the client more likely to want to switch company. In this 
case, if agent does not own the list and commission structure is back loaded as illustrated, 
the agent won’t be able to recover the acquisition cost, as it will lose the renewal premium, 
thus loosing incentive to deliver persistent clients. As a consequence, if the renewal is 
important and the company owns the list, then agent will not put effort in delivering 
persistent clients as there is the risk of possible actions taken by the company that can make 
clients to switch to other companies. Type (2) relate to the fact that, if the agent owns the 
list and the company develops an unanticipated new insurance product, then the clients 
cannot be solicited without the agent’s permission. Moreover, the agent who owns the list 
can encourage, he can encourage his clients to switch to other companies, if this seems 
advantageous for him, thus increasing agent’s profit at the expense of the company. The risk 
of this agent’s behavior distorts the ex ante investment of the company, i.e. the company, 
fearing the possible opportunistic behavior of the agent under invests in the relationship.  
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The optimal initial investment i.e. the ownership of policyholders list, given the potential 
noncontractibles, is finally determined by the sensitivity of the clients to agent’s actions and 
by the uncertainty of policy renewals.  
These variables are in turn affected by the kind of product offered by insurer. Indeed, in 
products in which the renewal is not guaranteed and is sensitive to the agent’s actions, the 
agent will be more likely to own the list, whereas for product in which the renewal is more 
certain and is less sensitive to the agent’s actions, the company will be more likely to own 
the list.  
For some kind of insurance products, the effort devoted by agents to servicing clients and 
the persistence in the renewal is less important. A good example can be whole life 
insurance, which is characterized by long duration and no occurrence of renewals. In this 
case, once the contract is signed, there is no need for agents to keep effort in order to retain 
the client, and the client has fewer incentives to switch insurance company. Data for 1986 in 
the US market show that for property liability insurance, i.e. for product with short duration 
and high renewal uncertainty, agents that own the list represent the main distribution 
channel with 65% of total premium collected. While for life insurance where duration of 
contract is higher and renewal is not necessary or is not determined by agent’s effort, agents 
who own the list collect only 12% of total premiums.  
Regan (1997) sustains that both exclusive dealing and independent agency insurers will 
coexist in Property – Liability insurance market, but they will specialize in segments of the 
market in which the respective organizational form is optimal. In her study of Property – 
Liability insurance market, Regan (1997) develops the approach of Grossman and Hart 
(1986) deepening the analysis of the possible sources of opportunistic behaviors which can 
be: 
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- The need for asset specific investments. Asset specificity in insurance 
distribution concerns proprietary data processing, communication hardware and 
software and investments in advertising. Information systems that connect the 
various insurers to agencies are relationship specific as agency personnel must spent  
time, effort and money to use specific insurer related software. Thus investments in 
such specific technology are more likely to be made by exclusive dealing agents, 
while independent agents, representing more than one insurer have no incentives in 
pursue this investment. Also investments in brand name are more likely to be carried 
out by exclusive dealing agents as when an insurer invests in brand name rather than 
generic product advertising, it attracts costumers to its distributors and there is the 
possibility that an independent agent could free ride on these investments 
promoting a non advertising insurer over an advertising one. Relationship specific 
investments are more important for exclusive dealing insurers;  
- Complexity of the risk evaluation that is directly related to retention and 
management of specific information on insured riskiness. Independent agents enjoy 
greater advantages in this respect as information collected by the agent on a 
potential insured who is not acceptable under one insurer’s contract is retained for 
other insurers. The advantage for the agent is that risk classification effort is not 
wasted and is always compensated. On the other side insurers enjoy lower risk of 
misclassification. 
- Uncertainty, or exposure to underlying risk. On this side, it can be expected 
that the compensation of an independent agent for bearing risk is lower than that 
required by exclusive agency, as independent agents can diversify their portfolio both 
across insurers in a particular line and across insurance lines. Moreover independent 
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agents share the risk by participating both to gain and losses of the various insurers. 
Independent agency is preferred when environmental uncertainty is higher.  
Regan (1997) and Regan and Tennyson (1996) find out that independent agency system will 
be preferred by insurers marketing complex products or operating in lines and markets 
where uncertainty is higher, while exclusive dealing insurers are able to invest in relationship 
specific assets that lower production costs and give them advantage in relatively 
standardized lines and markets. Indeed, independent agents, owning the policyholders list 
put more effort in collecting information on clients as they have several outside placement 
opportunities being more suited for risky and not standardized products which require an 
higher effort in gathering information. In contrast, exclusive agency will be worthwhile only 
if there are a sufficient number of consumers within easily categorized risk classes. 
The empirical results confirm the dependence of the optimal contractual relationship to the 
characteristics of the different insurance products and lines of market.  
On the basis of property right theory and the analysis of noncontractibles, Regan and Tzeng 
(1999) clarify the relationship between distribution channel and ownership form. Regan and 
Tzeng (1998) aim at searching for correlation between ownership form and distribution 
system on the basis of: 
- Underlying uncertainty or exposure to risk: 
- Complexity of products 
- Concentration by line of business (business mix) 
The results show that both stock and independent agency insurers allocate a large portion of 
their underwriting capacity to riskier product lines (commercial lines). Regarding 
specialization, there is a correlation across distribution system and ownership forms but 
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evidence shows relevant difference in business mix across stock owned firms and 
independent agency. 
 
4.3 Proposed explanation of the co – existence of joint ventures and contractual 
agreements 
We try to relate the property right framework developed for the insurance distribution 
system to the choice of insurers’ integration level with banks. In particular we suggest an 
explanation about why joint ventures and distribution agreements co exist within several l ife 
insurance markets.  
Joint ventures between banks and insurance are seen by the qualitative literature as a step 
toward further integration (Hoshcka, 1994) but these agreements co exist since the Nineties 
and, moreover, results on the Italian life insurance market show that joint ventures’ 
characteristics such as product specialization and distribution form lead to higher cost 
efficiency, even compared to higher forms of integration such as wholly bank owned 
companies (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2010). Looking at the framework proposed by Tennyson 
(1997), we will conclude that the joint ventures are the optimal organizational form for the 
segment of market in which they are specialized.  
Indeed, we can think that joint ventures between banks and insurers as an optimal form of 
vertical integration for insurance conglomerates that aim at specialise into unit and index 
linked policies. 
In order to reach this conclusion we look at the specific characteristics of unit and index 
linked products within the framework proposed by Tennyson (1997).  
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The unit and index linked products are very standardized, with high financial content 
underlying risk borne by policy holders.  
Looking at the need for assets specific investment, we consider that the unit and index 
linked product show a high level of product standardization. In this case we can assume that 
brand name of the supplier will be crucial in order to reach market share, thus specific 
investments are needed, leading to higher form of vertical integration. 
Moreover, given that unit and index linked products are not tailored on specific insurers’ 
need, the complexity of the risk evaluation is very low, and thus even in this case, vertical 
integration with banks as distribution channel is the best option in order to minimi ze 
opportunistic behaviours. 
Uncertainty, or exposure to underlying risk is also very low for these products as the 
investment risk is borne by policyholders and not by the insurers. Even in this case, 
according to the property right approach, more integrated distribution systems suits better.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper gives an overview of the qualitative and quantitative literature on 
bancassurance. It is evidenced that a gap exists as the co existence of different 
bancassurance ventures is not considered within the insurers’standpoint.  
Qualitative studies that analyse the co existence of different bancassurance forms of co 
operation adopt either an institutional bank centered approach or a functionalistic 
approach. The first approach stresses the need not only for contractual agreement that are 
in tune with a customer driven strategic plan, but also that are in tune with the idiosyncratic 
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situation of the bank engaging into insurance activities (Hoschka, 1984). The functionalistic 
approach emphasizes the leading role of the distribution as leading force in determining the 
choice of the contractual agreements (Van den Berge et al, 1999),  
The quantitative literature analyzes the bancassurance phenomenon looking at costs, 
revenues and risk synergies brought by diversification as well as the effects of financial 
conglomerates on competiton. Still there is a gap in the analysis of the co existence of the 
several bancassurance forms. The only study we are aware of in this field regards the Italian 
market for life insurance (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2010) and finds out that cost and profit 
efficiency differences across joint ventures and insurers totally own by banks which can be 
determined by the characteristic of product specialization and distribution system.  
We propose to use the property right framework already applied to intra sector dynamics on 
the co existence of several insurance distribution systems in order to explain the co 
existence of the various bancassurance models.  
Given the high involvement of bancassurers in unit and index linked products which are 
characterized by high level of standardization and low underlying risk, the analysis of non 
contractibles as carried out by Regan (1997) lead us to say that higher forms of integration 
such as joint ventures are more efficient than simple contractual agreements when the 
company is specialized into quasi banking products. 
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Bancassurance and scale economies: evidence from Italy  
 
1. Introduction 
Consolidation and convergence processes impressively animated the evolution in the 
financial sector in recent years. Increased removal of barriers between industries  and 
mobility of capital flows together with enhancements due to the development of prudential 
supervision allowed firms to seek for higher performance and efficiency in order to cope 
with increased competition. On the other side, from a consumers' perspective, an easier 
access to a wider range of financial products enhanced the demand for less expensive, 
better performing and more sophisticated investment opportunities. 
Within this framework bancassurance can be definitely considered a  major issue. Early 
innovations toward the convergence of banks and insurers date back to 1965 in the UK, 
although a wider development in this direction was already achieved in France and Spain in 
1970s and 1980s. Distribution of insurance products through bank branches has been 
recently preferred by an increasing number of European insurers, in spite of a high degree of 
heterogeneity in models and differences in market shares across countries. Among potential 
explanations,, cost synergies and distribution advantages still represent the main benefits 
and risks associated to bancassurance, originating from  cross -selling opportunities and joint 
back-office activities (asset management, human resources and IT).  
At the same time, different models of bancassurance exist and influence the variety of 
advantages and successes across time and countries, in particular considering the level of 
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integration reached by various ownership models  (distribution agreements, joint ventures 
and acquisitions, captive companies, mergers) [Hoschka (1994); Locatelli et al. (2003)].  
In this study we focus on the effects of bancassurance ownership models on scale 
economies. Despite a wide literature on scale economies as well as on the determinants of 
bancassurance exists, we  contribute to previous research by jointly considering these two 
aspects and by testing previous findings in the post-crisis scenario, when we expect to find 
that adverse systemic market conditions increased scale inefficiencies. 
Our paper focuses on the Italian market and considers it a proper testing ground for 
several reasons. Since the 1990s the Italian insurance industry has undergone major changes 
after deregulation took place that allowed banks to own controlling interests in the 
insurance sector. Unlike several other countries, banks entered an already mature 
marketfostering a significant product diversification and a noticeable reduction of 
distribution costs. The Italian life insurance market has been strongly influenced by 
bancassurance, as bank branches in 2012 represent a comprehensive market share of 50 per 
cent, after having exceeded 60 per cent in 2006 [ANIA (2013)], whereas their importance is 
even higher when considering policies with higher levels of financial risks. The entrance of 
quasi-banking insurance products reshaped the industry in the 1990s throughout the mid 
2000s and increased the exposure of market players to the financial crisis. Finally, all 
bancassurance models are present and active in the Italian market, allowing a comparative 
analysis of their performance.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
most relevant literature on this topic. In Section 3 we describe our data and methodology. In 
Section 4 we discuss our findings. Section 5 concludes our paper and provides our policy 
considerations and suggestions for further research.  
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2. Literature review 
Within the European financial sector the removal of regulatory barriers, the integration and 
harmonization processes within the single market and the evolution of the securities' 
industry pushed market players to pay greater attention on their efficiency in allocating 
resources in a more competitive environment. At the same time more sophisticated financial 
needs contributed to the fast and heterogeneous expansion of bancassurance. Literature in 
this area can be connected to the broader field of mergers and acquisitions, where 
bancassurance is investigated from a number of different perspectives.  
We distinguish two main streams of research.   
The first stream involves qualitative and theoretical literature exploring the foundations 
and development of bancassurance. According to Chen et al. (2009) this is the most 
numerous if compared to more recent quantitative research. Banks and insurers express 
several similarities [Voutilainen (2005)] that underline potential benefits of convergence and 
cross-sector linkages [Bergendahl (1995); Kist (2001); Falautano and Marsiglia (2003); 
Staikouras (2006)], however with strategic and managerial challenges [Benoist (2002); 
Dorval (2002); Van den Berghe and Verweire (2001)]. Within the same stream several 
authors have focused on specific markets to describe similarities or to compare evolutionary 
trends across countries, also encompassing convergence models between banks and 
insurers [Morgan et al. (1994); Verweire (1999); Benoist (2002); Dorval (2002); 
Lymberopoulos et al. (2004); Chevalier et al. (2005); Staikouras (2006); Kalotychou and 
Staikouras (2007); Artikis et al. (2008); Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008)]. 
The second stream focuses on quantitative and empirical research with a number of 
different methodological perspectives. Within this literature we can distinguish between 
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three major issues: the first encompasses equity wealth effects of bancassurance deals and 
the determinants of value creation, the second focuses on risk profiles of aggregations 
between banking and non-banking entities, while the third specifically addresses scale 
economies for  insurance market.  
Regarding the first subset few studies have provided evidence of positive size-related 
effects of mergers across the financial sector [Johnston and Madura (2000); Carow (2001a 
and 2001b); Carow and Heron (2002)]. Diversification within financial conglomerates 
provides mixed evidence [Cowan et al. (2001)], from positive effects  due to scale economies 
[Templeton and Severiens (1992); Estrella (2001)] and market responses [Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000)], or even finding evidence of discount factors placed on conglomerates due to 
agency conflicts [Laeven and Levine (2005)].  
Recent research focused on bancassurance evidences positive market reactions to 
mergers  highlighting benefits in terms of economies of scale, scope and geographical 
diversification [Fields et al. (2007)]. Staikouras (2009) examines a global sample of major 
bancassurance ventures between 1990 and 2006 through an event study methodology, 
finding significant positive returns for bank bidders and significant losses for insurance-
bidders. Moreover, results indicate that profitability and size of the deal are the major value 
drivers, while abnormal returns and functional diversification exhibit a neg ative relationship. 
These results are consistent with Dontis-Charitos et al. (2011) who find positive stock market 
reactions to bancassurance deals for bank bidders, while for insurer bidders results are not 
significant. This could be explained within the contestable market theory: as the deal might 
reduce long-term profits for existing insurers and increase competition in the insurance 
market.  
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The second subset focuses on the analysis of risks associated with bancassurance deals 
and provides mixed results. Casu et al. (2011) find that, despite total and idiosyncratic risks 
of acquiring institutions are not affected significantly, an increase of systematic risk exposure 
of banks is observed. Looking at specific determinants of risk they also find that resul ts are 
driven by the size of operations. Elyasiani et al. (2010) investigate international deals with 
banks as acquirers between 1990 and 2006, finding a decline in the overall risk exposure for 
the acquirer due to a decrease in unsystematic risk. This is interpreted as a consequence of 
the increased market share of conglomerates which raises concerns about greater post-deal 
systemic risk exposure.  
The third quantitative subset investigates cost benefits of bancassurance and their link 
with competition: in this sense conglomerization is expected to grow until scale economies 
are depleted. On the role of bancassurance in Italy, Cummins et al. (1996) provide a pioneer 
study which, applying micro-econometric methodologies, investigates the effects on 
technical efficiency of technological changes in the insurance industry over the period 1985-
1993. Results show no effects on efficiency and a significant decline in productivity, 
noticeably in years following banks’ entrance in the insurance market and attributable to a 
technological regress. Consistently, Turchetti and Daraio (2004) show that for motor 
insurance, not being affected by banks’ entry, results do not show strong variations either in 
efficiency or technological change over the period 1982-1993. Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011) 
employ a stochastic frontier methodology to analyze cost and profit efficiency due to 
distribution and bank ownership for the life insurance market in 2005-2006. They find 
evidence in favor of bancassurance in terms of cost efficiency originating from firm-specific 
factors such as share of premiums collected through bank branches and proportion of quasi -
banking products, whereas joint ventures’ specialization in financial products is negatively 
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related with profit efficiency. Although looking at the relationship between bancassurance 
and efficiency, previous studies do not consider the effects on scale economies. 
Scale economies within the insurance sector have been investigated by several studies. 
Fecher et al. (1991) analyze the French life and non-life insurance market to address the 
optimal scale and productive efficiency of various institutional forms (stock, foreign, mutual 
and public companies), arguing that scale economies contribute to relatively high prices and 
finding overall scale economies in life insurance, except for public entities. Bikker and Van 
Leuvensteijn (2008) and Bikker (2012), studying the Dutch life insurance industry, measure 
competition by looking at scale economies through a translog cost function and find the 
existence of substantial unused scale economies. Bikker (2012), following the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm, stresses the relevance of scale economies as a measure of 
competition and thus inefficiency. In the US, Houston and Simon (1970), Prichett (1971) and 
Cho (1986) find some evidence of increasing scale economies in the life sector in different 
years. Results on a more comprehensive sample provided by Grace and Timme (1992) show 
positive returns to scale for most firms (except for the largest agency companies). Kellner 
and Mathewson (1983), instead, find that firm size for the Canadian market is consistent 
with zero profits. More recently, Fenn et al. (2008) provide a cross-country research for 
Europe between 1995 and 2001, arguing that over this period most insurers were operating 
under increasing returns to scale. Focusing on the Italian market, Focarelli (1992) uses a 
translog cost function with cross-section data for 1987, i.e. before deregulation allowed 
banks to enter the insurance market finding modest scale economies that increase 
moderately with company size which can be attributed to the maturity of the market.  
In Table 1 we provide a brief summary of the main output and input variables and proxies 
adopted by prominent literature on insurance and scale economies.  
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[Insert Table 1 about here]  
Although the choice of output proxies for the analysis of insurance industry has been 
widely debated, the majority of papers focused on insurance adopt the production approach 
[Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011); Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008); Fenn et al. (2008)], 
consistently with Cummins and Weiss (1998) who define insurance output by looking at the 
value added in three main areas: 
 Risk pooling/risk bearing activity: by insuring, life policyholders benefit from a risk 
pooling mechanism for the risks of premature death or survival. The actuarial and 
underwriting expenses incurred are important components of the value added by 
the industry, including holding equity capital to bear residual risks. 
 Real financial services relating to insured losses: insurers provide a variety of 
specialized services for policyholders, including financial planning and 
management of collective annuities and health insurance plans. 
 Intermediation: insurers invest premiums’ proceedings in assets that are not 
available to most investors (for instance privately placed bonds and structured 
securities). Insurers' value added is reflected in the net interest margin between 
returns earned and those credited to policyholders. 
According to Cummins and Weiss (1998) output can be proxied by premium income or by 
the present value of incurred losses, incurred benefits can proxy the expected present value 
of future claims and, to take into account the intermediation function, additions to 
provisions are added to incurred claims. A minor stream in the literature refers to the 
intermediation approach [Focarelli (1992); Berger and Humphrey (1997); Brockett et al. 
(2005)], seeing financial institutions as primarily intermediating funds between savers and 
investors. Accordingly, the main insurers' activity is to borrow funds and transforming 
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liabilities into assets, receiving and paying interests as a compensation for the time value of 
funds. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We employ the database INFOBILA published by ANIA (Italian National Association of 
Insurance Companies). The database gathers financial statements and segment reporting for 
about 90% of licensed companies in the Italian market. The raw sample consists of all direct 
life insurers collecting premiums from 1998 to 2012, leading to 1,314 firm-year observations. 
After eliminating unreliable (negative or zero values, since our models requires logarithms), 
not relevant (i.e. subject to liquidation processes) or missing data we came to a refined 
unbalanced panel of 1,303 firm-year observations, with individual data deflated at 2012 
prices.  
Companies are then divided in groups depending on their ownership model, consistently 
with Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011). We reconstructed each company’s history through four main 
sources of information: 
 publicly available data from "Le Principali Società Italiane" edited by Mediobanca, 
which identifies insurance groups and related participating interests; 
 the database Zephir from Bureau Van Dijk for data on mergers and acquisitions; 
 reports from the Italian Antitrust Authority (AGCM) on non-controlling participating 
interests; 
 companies’ websites and press releases. 
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Companies are divided in three groups2: independent insurers, insurers totally owned by 
banks3 and joint ventures. Companies that are part of financial conglomerates are 
considered held by banks or insurers on the basis of the prominent activity of the whole 
group and their leading supervisory authority.  
Differences in output production and specialization across bancassurance models are 
summarized by Figure 1, presenting the relative market share of our three groups.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here]  
Until 2005 bancassurers eroded independent insurers’ market shares. Then, just before 
the triggering of the financial crises, the latter recovered at the expense of insurers owned 
by banks, whereas more recently joint ventures’ seem to steadily lose ground compared to 
other groups. This evolution can be explained by considering product differentiation at the 
firm’s level. The financial crisis impacted heavily the banking sector and affected quasi -
banking insurance products, such as unit-linked policies, which are mainly distributed by 
bancassurers. As a result bancassurance groups and joint ventures in particular switched to 
more traditional and with-profits policies, especially those with guaranteed minimum 
returns where independent insurers are still market leaders.  
To grasp these time-effects, we further detail our sample by considering two sub-periods 
based on output growth and composition as well as M&A waves that took place in this 
market and effects due to the financial crises: 
                                                 
2 In an earlier version of this paper we divided our sample in six groups, considering intermediate 
levels of integration. However, additional groups showed poor statistical significance and a reduced 
number of observations: therefore we focused on these three major models. 
3 Due to its particular nature this group includes Postevita (controlled by Poste Italiane) which 
distributes insurance products exclusively through post branches.  
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 1998-2006: in this period unit- and index-linked products grew substantially and 
peaked in 2005-2006. The market experienced in 2004-2005 a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions: active companies were on average 94 per year. 
 2007-2012: the post-crisis period sees traditional policies leading the overall output. 
The average number of active players is 76 per year.  
Table 2 shows the size of our sample, underlining how consolidation mainly invested 
independent insurers and companies owned by banks if compared to joint ventures.  
[Insert Table 2 about here]  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of average total costs for the three bancassurance groups.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here]  
Total costs significantly increased in the analyzed span but at different paces, supporting 
the hypothesis of ownership model’s effects on cost efficiency. Independent insurers 
experienced a lower level almost constantly growing, whereas the two integrated groups 
behaved similarly until 2005 and diverged significantly after 2009.  
In order to analyze scale economies we adopt the traditional translog cost function 
[Christensen et al. (1973)], which, for the s-th company, can be writtenas: 
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TC are total costs (incurred claims and benefits, change in technical provisions, bonuses 
and rebates, acquisition costs, administrative expenses, financial charges including those 
arising from contracts where the investment risk is borne by policyholders, other technical 
expenses, other operating expenses, non-operating expenses and income taxes, all gross of 
reinsurance); y represents gross written premiums [Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008); 
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Fecher et al. (1991)]; distr is the ratio between distribution costs and gross premiums as a 
proxy for the price of distribution channels [Fecher et al. (1991); Focarelli (1992)]; adm is the 
ratio between administrative expenses and gross written premiums as a proxy for the price 
of human resources, marketing and IT activities. Unlike Fenn et al. (2008) and Fiordelisi and 
Ricci (2011) we do not extend the model to variables exogenous to accounting data, such as 
proxies for investment returns, debt capital or labor costs, because of scarce availability of 
market data able to discriminate between production technologies for our three groups.  
Estimations are carried out through a mixed-effect panel data model [Laird and Ware 
(1982)] where the individual company effect is treated as a random effect: the individual-
specific constant terms are seen as randomly distributed across cross -sectional units. Data 
are grouped in order to consider individual firms throughout time: every group is composed 
by the various observations of the same individual in different years.  
For the single group or firm (s) the model takes the following form: 
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The term stsb   is the stochastic part of the model encompassing the stochastic error 
st  and the random-effect sb , which depends only from the individual and is randomly 
distributed. The term t is the dummy fixed-effect for time, independent from the individual 
company. The term  ss DD 322   is a dummy for the bancassurance model treated as a 
fixed-effect (respectively, for insurers owned by banks and joint ventures). The other terms 
  
 
60 
are the independent variables of the translog cost function. We estimate the coefficients of 
the model using a restricted maximum likelihood estimator (REML)4.  
In order to check for the existence of scale economies we employ a typical measure of 
output’s cost-elasticity [Clark (1988)]. In the case of a multiproduct firm, scale economies or 
diseconomies exist if the derivative of total costs with respect to output is significantly 
different from the unity:  

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Since our production function considers only one output:  
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 indicates economies of scale.  
The statistical significance is based on a Wald Chi-square test with the null-hypothesis 
being the elasticity equal to one and with constraints vectors fixed to mean values for each 
bancassurance group. 
Given the translog function described by Equation 1, elasticity results as follows:  
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      (4) 
Looking at the translog specification, the change in elasticity as output changes is given 
by yy . The coefficient of the squared output is determinant in analyzing the existence of 
scale economies: if positive it indicates that smaller firms experience larger cost benefits on 
additional production. 
 
                                                 
4 For a review of restricted maximum likelihood estimators see Harville (1977). More details on the 
methodology used in this paper are provided in the Appendix.  
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4 Empirical findings and discussion 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for our data.  
[Insert Table 3 about here]  
The mean of the dependent variable (i.e. total costs) for the two spans is higher for 
groups II and III in comparison to the sample mean. All three groups experienced an increase 
in total costs in the second sub-period but with different sizes: independent insurers by 
almost 58 per cent, companies owned by banks by 67 per cent and joint ventures by almost 
9 per cent. Insurers linked to banks are on average larger in terms of premiums than 
independent insurers. The average output growth is higher for independent insurers and 
bank-owned entities in more recent years (respectively, by around 65 and 60 per cent), 
whereas joint ventures decreased in output by 3.5 per cent. The incidence of distribution 
and administrative costs on premiums appears lower for bancassurance models, although 
insurers owned by banks show a higher dispersion in terms of distribution prices in more 
recent years. Finally, distribution costs have been slightly increasing over the period 1998-
2012, whereas administrative costs decreased only in more recent years.  
The first set of results obtained from our regression is summarized in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 about here]  
Distribution costs as a share of written premiums do not explain the variability of total 
costs. Written premiums and the administrative costs ratio, instead, are positive and 
significant for both periods. However, the two sub-periods present different cost functions. 
In early years the cost function is homothetic: output-prices cross-products coefficients 
12 and 13  are not significantly different from zero. In more recent years, instead, 13  is 
significantly different from zero and exhibits a negative sign. Moreover, in 2007–2012 the 
own output elasticity 11 reveals a negative sign. In presence of a negative coefficient, as in 
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our case for 2007-2012, unexhausted scale economies are more likely for bigger firms, 
possibly implying that further consolidation would not be efficient. The more recent sub-
period is also characterized by a higher volatility attributable to the systemic shock due to 
the financial crises.  
Table 5 presents results referred to the time-effect. 
[Insert Table 5 about here]  
Coefficients for the time dummy consider the first year in each sub-period as its 
benchmark. We find significant coefficients only for 2008 and 2009, following the triggering 
of the financial crises. We argue that changes in the demand and turbulence in financial 
markets impacted heavily the whole bancassurance market and enhanced differences in cost 
efficiency across firms regardless of their ownership model.  
Table 6 presents the group-effect, analyzed by taking independent insurers as our 
benchmark: dummies’ coefficients therefore measure if bancassurers on average show 
differences in total costs if compared to independent insurers. 
[Insert Table 6 about here]  
Our three groups do not show significant cost differences in the first sub-period, while 
bancassurance models diverge significantly from independent insurers in the aftermath of 
the financial crises. These results might reinforce the hypothesis that, despite diversification 
benefits for bancassurance ventures normally exist, the financial crises exposed higher cost 
levels for more integrated models.  
The latter finding should be completed by investigating the existence of scale economies: 
results deriving from Equation 4 are presented in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 about here]  
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Our first sub-period is characterized by the presence of scale diseconomies for 
bancassurance groups due to average higher premium collection mainly through bank 
branches while independent companies show constant returns to scale. The higher cost 
efficiency and lower profit efficiency of bancassurers before the financial crisis [Fiordelisi and 
Ricci (2011)] may have led these groups to overcome the optimal production scale within a 
slightly increasing demand for unit- and index-linked products. In more recent years, 
however, we find diffused scale economies, which is consistent with recent results for other 
European countries [Bikker (2012)]. The crisis that hit the financial industry led to wide 
changes in the demand for quasi-banking and traditional insurance products, as well as a 
shift across these products as investors moved from riskier investments to safer traditional 
or with-profit policies. This temporary shock on institutions and demand seems to have 
restored some scale economies that are lower for bancassurance groups. Finally, since the 
market showed an overall good level of competition and consolidation in 1998-2006, from 
our results it could be argued that scale inefficiency emerging from the financial crises might 
fade in forthcoming years as market players adapt to new market conditions.  
 
5 Conclusions 
The theoretical literature predicts the existence of cost-efficiency benefits for life insurers 
adopting bancassurance models despite empirical contributions do not always lead to 
consistent findings. Different forms of bancassurance integration co-exist (distribution 
channels, back-office activities, conglomerates) and alternative ownership models may 
influence advantages and risks for banks and insurers. 
Examining a unique dataset on all active Italian life insurers from 1998 to 2012, we search 
for cost benefits and scale economies explained by ownership models. We focus on the 
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Italian market because of the relevance of bancassurance, the presence of all integration 
forms, its importance within Europe and the  reshape of an already mature insurance sector.  
We distinguish between three groups of entities based on the strength of their 
integration with the banking sector. We test for the existence of scale economies within 
each group through a mixed-effect model of a translog cost function. In order to assess the 
effects of product diversification, consolidation and the financial crises, we consider two 
separate time spans: therefore we are able also to control for industry-wide time-effects. 
We contributed the extant literature finding that bancassurers do not overperform 
independent insurers in terms of scale economies. Before 2007 insurers owned by banks and 
joint ventures seem to have exceeded the optimum level of output and show modest scale 
diseconomies. On the contrary, independent insurers appear in equilibrium in the same 
period. The post-crisis period, however, shows that changes in demand and shocks in the 
financial sector generated scale economies for all groups but in particular for independent 
insurers. The life insurance market operated with different cost functions before and after 
the crisis, with no significant explanatory power of distribution costs. Therefore, we provide 
additional evidence that the level of scale economies can change significantly in a mature 
market when external shocks reshape market conditions. Moreover, a product mix favoring 
traditional and with-profits policies could imply a more stable environment for independent 
insurers. Finally, unexhausted scale economies in the post-crisis sub-period and the negative 
coefficient for the own output elasticity might suggest to competition authorities and 
policymakers that a new consolidation phase within the life insurance industry would not be 
efficient. 
This analysis is limited  because we do not consider specific exogenous variables to 
control for effects of bank branches in distribution channels as in Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011), 
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i.e. we do not cross-selling agreements for which scarce data is publicly available.. Finally, we 
acknowledge that future developments of this stream of research should include variables 
exogenous to accounting data and able to discriminate between production technologies 
across bancassurance groups. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: Input and output metrics 
 
 
Output Output proxies Input/netput Input prices proxies 
Focarelli  (1992) (i) flow of direct 
insurance  
(ii) flow of reinsurance 
(iii) flow of financial 
management 
(iv) flow of real estate 
management 
Attribution of 
operating revenues 
and expenses to 
the four output 
areas 
Labor 
Capital 
Commercial 
network 
HP of perfect 
competitive labor and 
capital markets. Cross 
section one year data: 
distribution costs as 
ratio between 
commercial expenses 
and premiums 
Fiordelisi  and 
Ricci (2011) 
Expected present 
value of future claims 
Net claims paid, 
plus bonuses and 
rebates, plus 
addition to 
provisions 
Equity 
Technical 
Provisions (as 
netputs) 
Business services 
and materials (as 
inputs) 
Investments  
Ratio of net operating 
expenses and technical 
charges on total assets 
(technical costs) 
Ratio of investment 
charges on total assets 
(investment costs) 
Fenn et al. 
(2008) 
Expected present 
value of future claims 
Net claims paid, 
plus bonuses and 
rebates, plus 
addition to 
provisions 
Total capital and 
reserves 
Total technical 
provisions 
Debt capital 
HP of competitive input 
markets. Nominal 
insurance wages. 
Long term government 
bond rates as price of 
debt capital 
Bikker and Van 
Leuvensteijn 
(2008) 
 Premium income Reinsurance  
Distribution  
Reinsurance ratio 
Acquisition ratio  
Fecher et al. 
(1991) 
 Premium income 
Claims 
Reinsurance  
Distribution  
Reinsurance ratio 
Acquisition ratio 
Source: own elaboration  
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Figure 1: Life insurance market share and ownership model 
 
Source: own elaboration on ANIA-INFOBILA database 
Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II are insurers totally  
controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held  by banks and other insurers. Market shares are bas ed on 
gross written premiums. 
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Table 2: Sample size  
 Group I Group II Group III Total 
1998 67 15 15 97 
1999 65 15 16 96 
2000 65 14 17 96 
2001 61 16 20 97 
2002 61 19 18 98 
2003 61 17 17 95 
2004 58 15 19 92 
2005 55 14 20 89 
2006 54 13 20 87 
2007 51 14 20 85 
2008 47 14 21 82 
2009 43 13 21 77 
2010 40 14 21 75 
2011 41 11 19 71 
2012 38 10 18 66 
1998-2006 547 138 162 847 
2007-2012 260 76 120 456 
Total firm-year obs. 807 214 282 1,303 
 
Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II are insurers totally  
controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers.  
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Figure 2: Average total costs and ownership model 
 
Source: own elaboration on ANIA INFOBILA Database  
Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II are insurers totally  
controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers. Average total costs are 
calculated as the within-group average of incurred claims and benefits, change in technical provisions, bonuses 
and rebates, acquisition costs, administrative expenses, financial charges including those arising from contracts 
where the investment risk is borne by policyholders, other technical expenses, other operating expenses, non-
operating expenses and income taxes, all gross of reinsurance.  
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Table 3: Main descriptive statistics 
  TC: Total costs ('000 Euro)  
 1998-2006  2007-2012 
  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max 
Group I 771 1,409 210 <1 9,280  1,215 2,163 286 1 11,345 
Group II 1,284 1,702 578 26 8,139  2,145 3,313 695 20 13,335 
Group III 1,316 1,777 722 7 10,812  1,432 1,634 793 27 6,495 
TOTAL  959 1,554 344 <1 10,812  1,427 2,298 460 1 13,335 
            
  Y: Output ('000 Euro) 
  1998-2006   2007-2012 
  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max 
Group I 504 912 137 <1 6,810  829 1,574 194 <1 9,418 
Group II 1,028 1,341 468 24 6,763  1,641 2,610 499 11 10,517 
Group III 1,103 1,474 589 6 9,104  1,064 1,259 534 17 5,432 
TOTAL  704 1,147 272 <1 9,104  1,026 1,742 355 <1 10,517 
            
  DISTR: Distribution costs ratio  
  1998-2006   2007-2012 
  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max 
Group I 0.0852 0.0684 0.0701 0.0014 0.4890  0.0840 0.1157 0.0540 0.0003 0.7194 
Group II 0.0569 0.0663 0.0403 0.0120 0.4618  0.0741 0.1386 0.0320 0.0035 0.6237 
Group III 0.0426 0.0288 0.0341 0.0118 0.1937  0.0523 0.0901 0.0297 0.0024 0.5799 
TOTAL  0.0724 0.0648 0.0538 0.0014 0.4890  0.0740 0.1144 0.0436 0.0003 0.7194 
            
  ADM: Administrative costs ratio  
  1998-2006   2007-2012 
  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max 
Group I 0.0608 0.1028 0.0303 0.0018 0.8672  0.0488 0.0785 0.0267 0.0020 0.6136 
Group II 0.0143 0.0131 0.0105 0.0010 0.0833  0.0223 0.0285 0.0127 0.0023 0.1318 
Group III 0.0130 0.0172 0.0068 0.0020 0.1213  0.0238 0.0347 0.0112 0.0027 0.2114 
TOTAL  0.0441 0.0861 0.0206 0.0010 0.8672  0.0378 0.0642 0.0202 0.0020 0.6136 
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Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II are insurers totally  
controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers. All variables are gross of 
reinsurance and expressed at 2012 prices. Accounting data is obtained from the public database INFOBILA, 
issued by ANIA (Italian National Association of Insurance Companies). TC are the sum of incurred claims and 
benefits, change in technical provisions, bonuses and rebates, acquisition costs, administrative expenses, 
financial charges including those arising from contracts where the investment risk is borne by policyholders, 
other technical expenses, other operating expenses, non-operating expenses and income taxes, all gross of 
reinsurance; Y are gross written premiums, DISTR is the ratio between distribution costs and gross written 
premiums, ADM is the ratio between administrative expenses and gross written premiums.  
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Table 4: Cost Function Estimates 
 
Variable 
1998 -2006   2007-2012 
Beta Std.Err. t-value   Beta Std.Err. t-value 
Const. 
2.1002 *** 0.2566 8.1859  1.1544 * 0.5401 2.1374 
(<0,001)     (0.0333)    
log(y) 
0.8481 *** 0.0518 16.3768  1.2520 *** 0.1144 10.9454 
(<0,001)     (<0.001)    
log(distr) 
0.0966 0.0614 1.5728  0.0153 0.0859 0.1785 
(0,1162)     (0.8585)    
log(adm) 
0.2879 *** 0.0608 4.7325  0.8682 *** 0.1476 5.8807 
(<0,001)     (<0.001)    
log(y)^2 
0.0117 * 0.0027 2.2000  -0.0390 ** 0.0064 -3.0572 
(0.0281)     (0.0024)    
log(distr)^2 
0.0124 * 0.0055 2.2617  -0.0117 0.0066 -0.8793 
(0.0240)     (0.3799)    
log(adm)^2 
0.0148 0.0075 0.9824  0.0127 0.0191 0.3327 
(0.3262)     (0.7396)    
log(y) log(distr) 
0.0002 0.0062 0.0386  -0.0011 0.0095 -0.1128 
(0.9692)     (0.9103)    
log(y) log(adm) 
-0.0085 0.0069 -1.2293  -0.0447 * 0.0184 -2.4344 
(0.2194)     (0.0154)    
log(distr) log(adm) 
-0.0033 0.0107 -0.3075  0.0161 0.0164 0.9790 
(0.7586)        (0.3283)      
AIC -945.2907  -162.3320 
BIC -841.4990  -84.7240 
Log-likelihood 494.6453  100.1663 
 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance a t the 0.999 level, ‘**’ at 0 .99 and ‘*’ at 0.95  
 
The table illustrates Betas  and p-values  for the translog cost function within the model described in Equation 2. 
Y are gross written premiums, DISTR is the ratio between distribution costs and gross written premiums, ADM is 
the ratio between administrative expenses and gross written premiums. The goodness-of-fit is measured by the 
AIC (Akaike information criterion), the BIC (Bayesian information criterion) and the log -likelihood of the entire 
model described in Equation 2.
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Table 5: Time Effect Estimates 
Year 
1998 – 2006 
Gamma Std. Err. t-value 
1999 
0.0135 0.0151 0.8977 
(0.3696)    
2000 
-0.0184 0.0152 -1.2141 
(0.2251)    
2001 
-0.0082 0.0154 -0.5349 
(0.5929)    
2002 
0.0053 0.0156 0.3372 
(0.7361)    
2003 
0.0045 0.0159 0.2817 
(0.7783)    
2004 
-0.0049 0.0163 -0.3022 
(0.7626)    
2005 
0.0152 0.0167 0.9062 
(0.3652)    
2006 
0.0097 0.0169 0.5757 
(0.5650)      
Year 
2007 – 2012 
Gamma Std. Err. t-value 
2008 
0.0702 *** 0.0205 3.4181 
(<0.001)    
2009 
0.0809 *** 0.0218 3.7164 
(<0.001)    
2010 
0.0272 0.0228 1.1931 
(0.2336)    
2011 
0.0302 0.0224 1.3488 
(0.1783)    
2012 
-0.0131 0.0232 -0.5647 
(0.5726)      
 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance at the 0.999 level  
 
The table illustrates the time effect within the model described by Equation 2 ( t ), together with standard 
errors, t-test and p-values. Each period is analyzed by comparison to a benchmark year, respectively 1998 and 
2007. 
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Table 6: Group Effect Estimates 
Group 
1998 – 2006   2007 – 2012 
Psi Std.Err. t-value   Psi Std.Err. t-value 
Group II 
-0.0482 0.0279 -1.7285  0.1557 
*** 
0.0464 3.3529 
(0.0843)     (<0.001)    
Group III 
-0.0125 0.0254 -0.4918  0.1686 
*** 
0.0402 4.1975 
(0.6230)        (<0.001)      
AIC -945.2907  -162.3320 
BIC -841.4990  -84.7240 
Log-likelihood 494.6453  100.1663 
 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance at the 0.999 level  
 
The table illustrates the group effect within the model described by Equation 2 as D , together with standard 
errors, t-test and p-values . Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II 
are insurers totally controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers. Each 
period is analyzed by comparison to a benchmark group (Group I). The goodness-of-fit is measured by the AIC 
(Akaike information criterion), the BIC (Bayesian information criterion) and the log-likelihood of the entire 
model described in Equation 2.  
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Table 7: Scale economies 
Group 
1998 – 2006   2007 – 2012 
Elasticity    Elasticity  
Group I 
1.012 3.244   0.857 ** 10.283 
(0.071)   (0.001)  
Group II 
1.040 *** 25.705  0.933 *** 14.902 
(<0.001)    (<0.001)   
Group III 
1.041 *** 25.756  0.942 *** 11.137 
(<0.001)      (<0.001)    
 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance at the 0.999 level, ‘**’ at 0 .99 and ‘*’ at 0.95  
 
The table illustrates the elasticity of total costs with respect to output as described by Equation 4 , together with  
the Wald Chi-square test and p-values . Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from 
banks, Group II are insurers totally controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other 
insurers. 
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APPENDIX  
LINEAR MIXED EFFECT MODELS 
In analyzing panel data we rely on fixed effects if we assume that differences across 
individuals are characterized by differences of the constant term. However, multiple 
measurements for each individual, such as repeated observation over time, generally result 
in correlation of within-subjects’ errors. Moreover, considerable variation among individuals 
in number and timing of observations might often affect data. The resulting unbalanced 
datasets are typically not effectively analyzed using a general multivariate model with 
unrestricted covariance structure [Laird and Ware (1982)]. Instead, data of this form can be 
analyzed using a variant of a two-stage model generally referred to as mixed-effects models. 
In this formulation the probability distribution for the multiple measurements has the same 
form for each individual but parameters of that distribution are allowed to vary across 
individuals. The distribution of these parameters or random effects in the population 
constitutes the second stage of the model [Laird and Ware (1982)].  
In our analysis we use a particular type of mixed-effect models considering only random 
intercepts for subjects and a constant slope with respect to the covariates. In this approach 
fixed effects describe patterns of change in the mean response over time in the population, 
while the random variables represent the individual’s deviation from the population mean 
intercept after the covariates have been accounted for. In order to consider variations 
among repeated observations of the same individual data are clustered in groups composed 
by observations for individual (s) over time. The hierarchical notation is as follows: 
sssssts bZXDaTC    
  
 
80 
With ),0(...~ 2INdii   and b ),0(....~ Ndii . 
TC is the response vector which comprises the logarithm of the total costs,   is the 
vector for the general intercept, t  is the dummy for the time effect, D  includes the 
dummy matrix D and the coefficients vector  to be estimated in order to grasp the effect of 
ownership models, X  comprises the matrix X with the logarithms of the cost function 
variables and the vector of coefficient   to be estimated, Zb  is the stochastic part of the 
model which encompasses the stochastic error term s , a random variable sb  and ssZ 1  to 
include only random intercept and constant slope. Finally,   is a positive definite 
symmetrical matrix independent from s. 
The parameters have been estimated through the restricted maximum likelihood 
approach (REML) using the “nlme” package of R. For a literature review on estimates 
through maximum likelihood, see Harville (1977). 
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Life insurers’ asset risk during the financial crisis: evidence from 
Italy 
 
1. Introduction 
The crisis fostered a global attention of regulators, supervisors, academics and the general 
public on financial institutions. After its triggering a number of entities, in particular banks, 
suffered from significant financial distress. Despite a high degree of variability, an 
unprecedented downturn hit all economies with an end not clearly foreseeable yet.  
The impact of this shock adds to the rapid evolution of financial markets. New 
technologies and knowledge facilitate the management of financial institutions but may also 
incentive complexity through innovation in products and strategies. At the same time, 
regulation and supervision encompassed a season of risk-based improvements that tried to 
guide these evolutionary trends, although frequently followed them.  
Life insurers and pension funds are major institutional investors. The increasing size of 
their investments, the thickening of connections with other intermediaries and the role on 
risk transfer mechanisms of customers raised several questions about their systemic 
relevance (Trichet, 2009). However, the criteria for identifying systemically relevant 
institutions (size, interconnectedness, substitutability; FSB, 2009) should distinguish specific 
features of insurers when compared to banks, in particular the timing of claims towards their 
liabilities (IAIS, 2009; Geneva Association, 2010). Nonetheless, insurers are exposed to 
market and credit risks with systemic relevance. 
Not surprisingly, risk-based supervision developed rapidly for banks, prone to the 
disruptive effects of runs. At the same time, insurers are not new to these concepts. 
European insurers, despite referring to a regulatory frame work dating back to 1970s 
(Solvency 1), comply with an implicit link between capital and risk. On the other hand, risk-
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based capital is frequently a supervisory tool in other countries, f.i. in the US since early 
1990s (RBC) and in Switzerland since mid 2000s (SST). The banking sector contributed 
significantly in this area through the Basel Accords. Insurers have also been experiencing 
improvements in this area, with country-based enhancements (specific restrictions on 
assets, UK’s “twin peaks” model, Denmark’s “traffic lights” system, etc.) as well as due to the 
long-term discussion on Solvency 2.  
The issue of how regulation and supervision should address and influence risk-taking 
activities of undertakings is particularly relevant from a political and academic perspective, 
since, by constraining competition, the welfare of customers may be altered.  
This paper contributes to this discussion by focusing on the relationship between asset 
risk and risk profiles of life insurers in the period 2005-2011.  
We focus on the Italian market, considering it a representative ground for our purposes 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, this is a competitive, developed and sizeable market 5: in 
2012, around 100 life insurers collected almost 70 billion EUR of premiums, with 437 billion 
EUR of assets under management (ranking fourth after France, the UK and Germany), with 
penetration rates as high as 4.5% (higher values are present only in the UK, France and 
Belgium). Secondly, products offered are well diversified, with technical provisions of 
traditional and with-profits business accounting for 300 billion EUR, policies linked with 
investment funds or indices for 90 billion EUR, capital redemption contracts for 25 billion 
EUR and pension fund management for 9 billion EUR. Moreover, despite financial results of 
insurers were severely affected by recent market trends, no disruptive effects have been 
recorded to date. Operating results rose in 2012 to almost 7 billion EUR, between three and 
four times their pre-crisis level and recovering from 2008’s and 2011’s unprecedented losses 
                                                 
5
 Statistics are obtained from ANIA (2013) and Insurance Europe (2013).  
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exceeding 3 billion EUR. Finally, the Italian market is subject to the European insurance 
regulation and supervision, but adopted some country-specific additional requirements.  
We employ a panel data analysis to assess the impact on asset risk of several firm 
characteristics, essentially testing the finite risk hypothesis (Baranoff and Sager, 2002 and 
2009). Additionally, we also make a contribution to the literature developed so far by 
studying the relationship between asset risk and the adoption of specific bancassurance 
models, given their strong presence of this phenomenon into the Italian life insurance 
market.  
Finally, we extend our analysis to take into account the variability of insurers’ risk profile 
over time, in order to address regulatory and macroeconomic aspects. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature on this 
topic. In Section 3 we briefly describe the Italian life insurance industry and formulate our 
hypotheses accordingly. In Section 4 we illustrate the econometric methodology and our 
data, whereas in Section 5 we present and discuss our findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
our paper, providing also some policy recommendations and suggestions for further 
research. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and literature review 
This work is closely linked with two streams of literature. The first refers to of the 
relationship between asset risk, product risk and capital among insurers. The second stream 
is specific to risk exposures of insurers involved in bancassurance M&A, functional in 
developing our additional hypotheses on the influence of bancassurance ownership models 
on portfolio choices. 
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Academic literature on insurers’ asset allocation has been mainly developed after the 
adoption of RBC regulation in the US, encompassing capital charges towards investment 
risks. Earlier studies established a reference framework within the broader analysis of 
enterprise and financial risk management (see f.i. Santomero and Babbel, 1997). The strong 
link between insurers, investments and regulation leads to a trade-off between returns and 
safety that seems to favour equity and similar investments for variable insurance policies to 
hedge inflation risks and offer an expected long-term positive real return (Davis, 2001).  
Baranoff and Sager (2011) review two major sets of theories concerned with the 
relationship between product risk, asset risk and capital. The first one, the finite risk 
hypothesis, predicts that capital and asset risk (as well as between capital and product risk) 
are positively correlated and insurers balance their overall risk-taking (Cummins and 
Sommer, 1996; Baranoff and Sager, 2002 and 2003). A second stream, the excessive risk 
hypothesis, predicts that firms may seek to increase their overall risk exposure.  
Asset risk can be defined either as a regulatory issue or an opportunity risk.  
Regulatory asset risk is based on an adjusted US RBC measure calculated as the sum of 
several loadings on the book value of a firm’s assets (Baranoff and Sager, 2002).  
Opportunity asset risk is a measure of volatility on hypothetical returns that insurers 
could have earned by investing their assets in matching indexes (Baranoff and Sager, 2011). 
Product risk may be proxied by each company’s range of contracts: in earlier works, 
Baranoff and Sager (2002) consider product risk as endogenously determined and associate 
it to the level of specialization in accident and health, the most risky line of business, and 
find that product risk and capital are negatively correlated. Evidence is mixed when 
considering the relationship between organizational and distribution strategies and asset 
risk (Chang et al., 2010) but seems stronger in the life sector (Baranoff and Sager, 2003). 
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More recently the analysis has been based on the business strategy hypothesis which is 
derived from the theory of transaction costs (Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Regan and Tennyson, 1996; Regan and Tzeng, 1999). This approach assumes that product 
risk is predetermined to capital and investment risks. This underneath hypothesis is also 
consistent with claims on the insurance business being liability-driven and on the importance 
of asset-liability management (f.i. Obersteadt, 2013). Since every class  of products may be 
associated to a specific level of asset risk, proxies have been obtained from the proportion of 
premiums attributable to health, annuities, life and reinsurance lines and clustering entities 
accordingly (Baranoff and Sager, 2011). Following this approach, Baranoff and Sager (2011), 
in analyzing U.S. life insurance during the financial crisis, find that companies remain within 
the finite risk boundaries but move towards the excessive risk area (Baranoff and Sager, 
2011). 
Other firm specific factors have been found relevant to determine the level of capital and 
asset risk. Baranoff and Sager (2011) find that larger size within most products segments is 
associated with lower capital ratio and with higher asset risk, arguing that dimension ma y be 
risk-neutralising, consistently with the notion of “too-big-to-fail”. This was recently 
confirmed by Obersteadt (2013), finding that larger companies have lower capital -to-asset 
ratios and accept higher levels of systemic risk but are more diversified and less volatile. 
Chang et al. (2010) proxy business risk with leverage ratios and control for complexity and 
specialization of the product mix; however, since they focus on non-life insurers, several 
variables (f.i. coefficient of variation of loss ratios, level of reinsurance and advertising 
expenses) are not relevant for the purposes of our analysis. 
Among firm specific factors that may have an impact on asset risk, we also include 
ownership linkages with banks. Following Baranoff and Sager (2003) by extending their 
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hypothesis on the importance of distribution system and organizational form in determining 
the level of asset risk and capital (in contrast with the evidence for U.S. non-life insurers 
provided by Chang et al. (2010)), we consider the relationship between bancassurance and 
portfolio choices as worth of further investigation.  
In order to develop our hypothesis, we follow the most recent literature exploring the 
effects of banks’ diversification into insurance activities on the idiosyncratic and systematic 
risk exposure which provides mixed evidence. Large and diversified banks that are involved 
in noninterest – income activities have found to bear higher systematic risk (Stiroh, 2006; 
see Casu 2010 for a deeper discussion). This implies that the bancassurance partnerships will 
also exhibit higher systematic risk.  
Among the extensive number of contributions on this topic, we evidence the following. 
Nurullah and Staikouras (2008) find that banks diversifying into life and non-life insurance 
activities significantly increase the volatility of their returns and the probability of 
bankruptcy. Baele et al. (2007) find that bank diversification is positively associated with 
systematic risk, but the relationship is negative with idiosyncratic and total  risks. Event-study 
analysis of bancassurance M&A achieve a similar conclusions. The importance of systematic 
risk on total risk is found to increase after banks’ acquisition of insurers and  is influenced by 
size rather than diversification. Idiosyncratic risk is found to fall (Elyasiani et al., 2011) or to 
remain unaffected after the deal (Casu et al., 2011), thus evidencing the risk of an 
overreliance on non-interest income for banks entering the insurance market. These last 
findings are consistent with Stiro (2004) who evidence that, at the micro level, increased 
reliance on non-interest income may lead to higher risk and lower risk-adjusted profits.  
Finally, there are other external (non firm specific) factors that influence the level of asset 
risk. First, a significant impact is due to regulatory changes. In Europe, Solvency 2 is expected 
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to increase charges on equity and alternative investments, potentially discouraging these 
exposures. Insurers hold low levels of these assets and impacts will be smaller where 
regulatory restrictions on investments are present (CGFS, 2011) and for more solvent 
entities (Dirk, 2013). Secondly, macroeconomic factors are also relevant. As institutional 
investors insurers are exposed to market shocks and volatility during financial crisis (Eling 
and Schmeiser, 2010).  
Low interest rates raise concern (Holsboer, 2000; Siglienti, 2000; Antolin et al., 2011) for 
entities that typically experience a greater duration of liabilities over assets: this affects 
reinvestment risk and products with minimum guaranteed returns (BCG – AXA, 2013), calling 
for additional regulatory and supervisory care for insurers and pension funds facing 
competition and “gambling for redemption” issues (IMF, 2011; Belke, 2013).  
Within this framework, the next Section summarizes the main features of the Italian 
market in order to formulate our hypothesis consistently. 
 
3. The Italian life insurance market and the research hypothesis 
The Italian life insurance market mainly encompasses traditional and with-profit policies 
(“Class I”), unit- and index-linked policies (“Class III”) and capital-redemption products 
(“Class V”). In recent years, distribution strategies and the crisis concurred in reshaping the 
demand and supply for insurance products, shifting from those with higher levels of financial 
risks to more traditional products (Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1] 
In this context it is not feasible to employ the measure of product risk as in Baranoff and 
Sager (2002), due to the limited presence of health insurance. However, to investigate the 
relationship between asset and product risk, it is possible to draw a risk-based distinction 
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grounded on the output mix: we follow Baranoff and Sager (2003 and 2011) in considering 
that every class of products may be associated to a specific level of asset risk, treating 
product risk as an exogenous variable.  
A first useful distinction of investments on the basis of product mix would be between 
investments covering technical provisions (classes I and V) and those where the ris k is borne 
by policyholders (classes III and VI6); both may be subject to minimum guaranteed returns, 
with the latter receiving more regulatory scrutiny.  
Italian insurers invest mainly in bonds and especially in long-term government debt, due 
to regulatory restrictions on assets and their capability of hedging nominal interest rate and 
inflation risks of technical provisions. Unfortunately, accounting data does not differentiate 
between government and corporate bonds, in particular for their credit standing. However, 
because of the traditional home-bias of investments, we argue that the effect on our results 
should be limited. Table 2 illustrates assets’ composition in the period 2005–2011. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The Italian insurance industry is characterized by a strong presence of various 
bancassurance models, from distribution agreements to joint ventures or full banking 
control: the majority of life policies are distributed through bank branches. Bancassurance 
groups if compared to their independent peers, are mostly involved into unit and index 
linked policies. Accordingly, their portfolio is affected as bancassurers hold a higher 
proportion of investments where the risk is borne by policyholders than independent 
insurers. Table 3 summarizes differences in portfolio composition across bancassurance 
groups. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                 
6
 Due to specialties of pension funds and the peculiar structure of this limited market in Italy, we do not 
investigate this differentiat ion further and will refer only to unit- and index-linked policies.  
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Looking at interest rates, the Italian market shows higher levels compared to other EU 
countries ever since the inception of the financial crisis, currently remaining above minimum  
guaranteed returns of policies that still assure the sustainability of related liabilities (BCG – 
AXA, 2013). At the same time, increasing credit spreads led to material unrealized losses in 
recent years, affecting at the same time the return on financial  business of insurers and 
potentially driving a higher degree of surrenders in with-profit policies where values are not 
adjusted to market fluctuations (Swiss Re, 2012). Therefore, we expect the “gambling for 
redemption” effect to be less likely to occur but not negligible. In this respect, the Italian 
supervisor (IVASS) began in 2013 a semi-annual stress testing to investigate these effects7. 
Anecdotally, several insurers active in the Italian market disclose to investors the intention 
to reduce exposures in equity due to expected future higher capital requirements. This 
phenomenon is not new or limited to the Italian market: European insurers have a long 
tradition of significant investments in equities that were already reduced after the market 
shocks in early 2000s (Sutton, 2004). This trend seems to have been exacerbated by the 
financial crisis (CGFS, 2001). Additionally, insurers may face the effects of an unintended 
double-standard, being compliant to current restrictions on assets and, at the same time, 
preparing for future requirements, rebalancing their investments in advance of new capital 
charges to reduce potential financial losses (Insurance Europe and Oliver Wyman, 2013).  
Individual company information on Italian insurers is still subject to local accounting 
principles, with lower sensitivity to market prices than IAS/IFRS accounting. Therefore, when 
transposing proxies for asset risk to the Italian market (Baranoff and Sager, 2002, 2003 and 
2011) we encounter the issue of defining individual risk loadings without a detailed 
                                                 
7
 Unfortunately, individual results are currently kept confidential between insurers and the supervisor. However, 
the market as a whole proved resilient to a long low-rate scenario, due to product mix of insurers with most 
minimum guarantees significantly below returns earned on investments (Rossi S., 2013).  
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breakdown of portfolios. However, we can refer to asset classes as meaningful proxies, 
considering that most regulatory frameworks generally require higher loadings on equity 
investments: therefore, the weight of these investments will represent our measure of asset 
risk. 
Combining the aforementioned considerations, we expect that Italian life insurers show 
an overall prudent asset risk profile, with limited effects from regulatory and 
macroeconomic factors and few changes on equity portfolios.  
Our hypothesis are derived as follows. 
According to the finite risk hypothesis we expect that higher involvement in unit- and 
index-linked policies, shifting financial risks to policyholders, lowers the overall risk profile of 
companies and allows for greater levels of asset risk within investments where the risk is 
retained by insurers. 
HP1: Firms involved in unit- and index-linked policies hold more riskier investments.  
Product diversification may also lower the overall risk, providing incentives in pursuing an 
aggressive investment policy. On the contrary, product specialization should be associated 
with a more prudent investment strategy.  
HP2: Higher product diversification is associated with a more aggressive asset allocation. 
Bigger U.S. insurance firms are found to be more able to diversify their operations and, 
therefore, to be better off in coping with systemic risk, as confirmed at least partially by 
recent results (Baranoff and Sager, 2011; Obersteadt, 2013).  
HP3: Size positively affects the portfolio weight of equity and riskier assets.  
Bank’s acquisition of insurance companies may have controversial effects on the resulting 
overall risk exposure.  
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While Elyasiani et al. (2011) find a drop in overall risk exposure, Casu et al. (2011) 
evidence no effects in this respect. Both studies raise concerns about an increasing 
exposure of conglomerates to market risk and systematic risk due to the effect of an 
increased size of institutions. Diversification provides no benefits in terms of idiosyncratic 
risk accordingly to Casu et al. (2011). On the contrary, Elyasiani et al. (2011) find a 
negative relationship between diversification and idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, we expect 
that bancassurance groups facing more systematic risks would pursue a less aggressive 
asset allocation strategy when engaging in traditional insurance business. HP4: 
Bancassurance is associated with less risky investments backing traditional and with-
profits products.  
Macroeconomic and regulatory effects may alter the aforementioned relationships across 
time, especially when affecting the risk profile of insurers. The financial crisis increased 
market and credit risks, thus providing incentives to reduce exposures to riskier assets 
especially when “gambling for redemption” does not seem to affect Italian insurers so far. 
However, a reduction in equity or an increase in bonds may be attributed also to a 
contingent search for greater yields. 
HP5: The crisis increased risks of assets and led insurers to invest more prudently. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
We based our analysis on accounting data collected from the database INFOBILA, published 
by ANIA (Italian association of insurance companies, representative of about 90% of the 
national market). Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 567 individual firm-year 
observations for the period 2005-2011. Since all firms reported a positive level for 
premiums, no exclusions occurred in our sample  
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The use of cost-based accounting data for investments may be seen as a limitation of this 
study; however, for conservative purposes a closer marking-to-market of assets during 
recessive phases is required, due to impairments or lower market values for non-durable 
items. Therefore, this should not significantly bias our results. At the same time, accounting 
data does not disclose different portfolios based on issuer (f.i. government and corporate 
bonds), residual duration or effective yields. Therefore we are forced to consider only 
macro-classes of investments. 
The inclusion into specific bancassurance models are attributed by reconstructing the 
history of each company in the period 2005-2011, accordingly to four sources: 
 "Le Principali Società Italiane", edited by Mediobanca, which identifies insurance 
groups and related participating interests; 
 the database Zephir from Bureau Van Dijk, for data on mergers and acquisitions; 
 reports from the Italian Antitrust Authority on non-controlling participating interests; 
 companies’ websites and press releases. 
We focus on three groups: I) insurers independent from banks; II) insurers controlled by 
banks; III) joint ventures. Table 4 summarizes our sample.  
[Insert table 4 here] 
For each firm-year we consider the weight of different asset classes on total financial 
investments (excluding infra-group exposures), namely land and buildings, financial assets 
where the risk is retained by insurers (traditional, with-profits and capital redemption 
policies) and those where the risk is borne by policyholders (unit- and index-linked policies). 
Our dependent variable is either the ratio of fixed income assets on total investments or the 
ratio of equities on total investments. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5.  
[Insert table 5 here] 
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Independent variables consider size, business mix, product divers ification, time and 
bancassurance models. Size and business mix variables are chosen consistently with the 
business strategy hypothesis (Baranoff and Sager, 2002, 2003 and 2011; Obersteadt, 2013), 
respectively as the value of total assets and the ratio of premiums for each class of business 
on total written premiums. Product diversification is measured by Rumelt’s diversification 
index (Rumelt, 1982), considering insurers as specialists if one line of business represents at 
least 70% of collected premiums, or as diversified entities otherwise. Time dummies allow 
for the intercept of our model to vary across time. Finally, bancassurance models distinguish 
between the aforementioned three groups. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics on 
independent variables, whereas Table 7 provides a broader picture on the generalised 
increase in the level of specialization across all bancassurance groups in our sample.  
[Insert table 6 here] 
[Insert table 7 here] 
Since we consider ratios of asset classes on total investments, we apply the following logit 
transformation for each class (Yi) in order to construct our regression: 
)]log(1/[)log()( iii YYYLOGIT  (1) 
After defining our variables, we run two pooled OLS regression with time-varying 
intercepts, one for each dependent variable (equities and fixed income investments) and 
with the same covariates. The general matrix form of the model is: 
),0(...~
)(
2 INdii
XDGYLOGIT ti

 
 (2) 
where t  is the time-effect, G  is the dummy for the bancassurance model (expressed 
in comparison with Group I, independent insurers, as benchmark), D  is the dummy for 
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diversification (taking value 1 in case of specialization, 0 for diversification), X  is the matrix 
of firm-specific variables and   is the vector of coefficients to be estimated.  
 
5. Discussion of findings 
Results for our two pooled OLS regressions are provided in Table 8. 
[Insert table 8 here] 
The coefficient for the proportion of premiums collected from unit- and index-linked 
policies is significant in both models, positively correlated with investments in equities and 
negatively when considering fixed income. The effect is stronger for equities than for 
investments in bonds. This result supports our first hypothesis: a higher share of investment 
risk borne by policyholders is associated with a higher risk retained by insurers in their own 
asset portfolio. However, the level of the coefficient does not underline a strong effect in 
terms of composition of investments. 
Diversification of products, entailing an expected lower level for the overall risk of a 
company, should be associated with higher levels of asset risk to confirm the finite risk 
hypothesis. Results show a strong, significant and negative correlation between  
specialization and the level of investments held in equities, as opposed by a positive but less 
significant coefficient for investments in fixed income. These findings support our second 
hypothesis. 
Also our third hypothesis, associating riskier assets with a bigger size of insurers, is 
supported. The effect is statistically significant in both models: strong and positive for 
equities, weaker but negative for investments in fixed income.  
Our fourth hypothesis associated the strength of bancassurance models to a lower share 
of investments in equities backing traditional products. Findings are supportive of this 
hypothesis only for firms controlled by banks, showing a strong and significant lower share 
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of investment in equities. Joint ventures do not provide statistically significant coefficients: 
the apparently less prudent investment behaviour of these entities could be explained by a 
lower involvement in traditional insurance products, since the latter are usually within the 
productive responsibility and expertise of the associated insurance group or entity. This 
explanation could be helpful also in considering that the higher share in equities held than 
insurers controlled by banks could be associated to a greater specialization in unit- and 
index-linked policies. Finally, if we consider investments in fixed income, both insurers 
controlled by banks and joint ventures hold a statistically significant lower proportion of 
bonds for which the investment risk is retained than independent insurers. This result could 
be interpreted again by considering their higher involvement in unit- and index-linked 
policies with the transfer of financial risk to policyholders.  
Our fifth and last hypothesis dealt with time-consistency of the finite risk hypothesis, 
namely expecting an effect on portfolio composition due to the generalized increase in risk 
triggered by the financial crisis. However, all time-dummy coefficients are not significant in 
the first model (equities). As already mentioned this effect may be due to a bias induced by 
cost-based accounting data. At the same time, this apparently negligible effect of external 
macroeconomic factors could be a result of the current regulatory prudential restrictions 
placed on assets, already in force before the triggering of the financial crisis that limited the 
exposure to market risks of Italian insurers. However, for investments held in bonds, years 
2010 and 2011 show an increase in the proportion of fixed income if compared to 2005. 
Being unable to distinguish across different categories of securities (corporate or 
government bonds) and their risk-return features, we cannot attribute this result to a more 
prudent investment behaviour or a contingent search for yield. 
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6. Conclusions 
Financial intermediaries experienced several challenges in recent years, in particular the 
global consequences of the crisis and the resulting announcement of tighter regulation and 
prudential supervision. Among them, life insurers and pension funds, as institutional 
investors with a long-term perspective, are significantly exposed to financial risks arising 
from their investment activity. Since these effects may impact portfolio choices, in this paper 
we analyze the relationship between firm-specific characteristics that are more closely 
associated with their risk-taking, and the asset risk of insurers measured by their asset 
allocation. We were motivated by the will to understand their reaction in terms of risk 
exposure to recent macroeconomic and regulatory changes. 
We focus on the Italian life insurance market for the period 2005-2011, due to its 
relevance within the European Union, the recent volatility of this industry’s financial results, 
its compliance with European as well as country-specific regulation. Moreover, in deriving 
the hypothesis of this study, we consider also specialties affecting the sustainability of their 
policy liabilities under the current generalised low interest rates scenario. We construct our 
panel data model within the finite risk hypothesis and with reference to the share on total 
investments of two main classes: equities and fixed income assets. 
We consider typical firm-specific factors suggested by relevant literature (size, product 
mix and business diversification). Unlike previous studies, we add bancassurance models as 
an explanatory variable, consistently with recent evidence on the effects of these ownership 
linkages on the overall risk exposure of conglomerates. Macroeconomic and regulatory 
factors are investigated indirectly by measuring changes in asset risk across time. 
Our results strongly support the finite risk hypothesis (Baranoff and Sager, 2002 and 
2003). Product diversification and engagement in policies where the investment risk is borne 
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by customers is associated with a riskier asset allocation. Unlike more recent evidence 
(Baranoff and Sager, 2011), we find that the hypothesis holds also during the financial crisis 
in the Italian market, i.e. we do not measure a move towards excessive risk-taking. 
Extending the hypotheses developed by Baranoff and Sager (2003), bancassurance could 
be seen as a particular combination of organizational form and distribution strategy that 
influences the asset risk level. The choice of a specific bancassurance models as an 
explanatory variable for asset risk is found to affect the level of asset risk consistently with 
the finite risk hypothesis: insurers controlled by banks hold a less risky investment portfolio 
when compared to independent insurers. Joint ventures, on the other side, show statistically 
significant results only for fixed income assets.  in the life sector: contrast those evidenced 
for non-life insurers by Chang et al. (2010). 
Finally, we find that macroeconomic factors led to a higher retention of fixed income 
assets that is moderately statistically significant only for more recent years, whereas the 
volatility of stock markets did not significantly affect positions in equities. These results may 
be biased by the use of cost-based accounting data. However, they can also be read in the 
light of a contingent search for returns from domestic bonds, within a current and expected 
regulatory framework penalizing investment in equities, driven by increased credit spreads 
experienced by the Italian market in a business traditionally subject to a home bias in asset 
composition.  
The main limitation of this study is the lack of harmonized details on investment 
portfolios of insurers that are publicly available, that could have allowed to discriminate the 
effective exposure of individual assets. More granular data and sources of systemic risk 
therefore call for further research.  
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As a concluding remark, our results confirm the relatively prudent investment behaviour 
often attributed to insurers and, in particular, to the Italian market. This could be also read 
as a positive consequence of regulatory restrictions placed on investments, while more 
sophisticated risk-based supervisory tools are expected to be enforced, with potential issues 
stemming from their final calibration.  
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Table 1 – Output composition of life insurers (2005-2011)  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Class I 46,10% 41,97% 44,22% 57,60% 79,81% 75,29% 76,76% 
Class III 35,92% 35,10% 47,29% 34,01% 12,00% 17,10% 16,92% 
Class IV 0,03% 0,03% 0,05% 0,05% 0,03% 0,03% 0,04% 
Class V 17,28% 11,46% 7,27% 5,86% 6,26% 5,72% 4,24% 
Class VI 0,67% 11,46% 1,17% 2,49% 1,90% 1,86% 2,05% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The table illustrates the proportion of product output of life insurers in the period 2005-2011. Classes 
are described as follows: I) Traditional and with-profits policies; III) Unit- and index-linked policies; IV) 
Health insurance; V) Capital redemption policies; VI) Collective pension funds. 
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Table 2 – Investment composition of life insurers (2005-2011) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Land and buildings 0.49% 0.43% 0.44% 0.48% 0.41% 0.31% 0.36% 
Equity investments 2.25% 2.00% 2.08% 1.60% 1.63% 1.52% 1.28% 
Mutual funds 2.45% 2.68% 2.54% 2.31% 2.48% 2.76% 3.20% 
Fixed income assets 60.41% 60.89% 59.77% 64.05% 67.56% 70.45% 72.15% 
Other financial assets 0.72% 0.66% 0.65% 1.42% 0.76% 1.09% 1.41% 
Unit-/index-linked  33.68% 33.33% 34.53% 30.14% 27.15% 23.86% 21.59% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The table illustrates the composition of investment portfolios of life insurers in the period 2005-2011. 
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Table 3 – Portfolio composition and bancassurance groups (2005-2011)  
Year Group 
Investment classes 
Land and 
buildings 
Equity 
investments 
Mutual  
funds 
Fixed  
income  
Other  
assets 
Unit-/index-
linked 
2005 
I 0.67% 2.72% 2.93% 69.98% 0.99% 22.71% 
II 0.43% 1.36% 1.52% 48.85% 0.56% 47.29% 
III 0.04% 1.55% 1.76% 42.20% 0.12% 54.33% 
2006 
I 0.54% 2.55% 3.20% 70.20% 0.94% 22.58% 
II 0.58% 1.28% 1.90% 52.52% 0.40% 43.32% 
III 0.03% 1.03% 1.85% 41.63% 0.08% 55.37% 
2007 
I 0.57% 2.69% 2.82% 68.26% 0.60% 25.06% 
II 0.56% 0.88% 2.63% 54.82% 1.63% 39.48% 
III 0.00% 1.38% 1.74% 41.57% 0.12% 55.19% 
2008 
I 0.52% 2.15% 2.83% 74.13% 0.92% 19.45% 
II 1.06% 0.75% 1.78% 57.30% 4.85% 34.26% 
III 0.00% 0.91% 1.52% 46.00% 0.24% 51.33% 
2009 
I 0.46% 2.14% 2.91% 74.22% 0.85% 19.42% 
II 0.89% 0.94% 2.19% 65.66% 1.64% 28.67% 
III 0.00% 1.03% 1.76% 55.12% 0.05% 42.05% 
2010 
I 0.45% 1.95% 3.24% 75.84% 1.20% 17.33% 
II 0.34% 0.99% 2.65% 67.13% 2.22% 26.67% 
III 0.02% 1.08% 1.92% 62.42% 0.14% 34.42% 
2011 
I 0.43% 1.64% 3.36% 75.83% 1.11% 17.63% 
II 0.60% 0.32% 4.47% 65.41% 3.90% 25.29% 
III 0.08% 1.07% 2.13% 68.13% 0.60% 28.00% 
Full 
period 
I 0.52% 2.26% 3.04% 72.64% 0.94% 20.60% 
II 0.64% 0.93% 2.45% 58.81% 2.17% 35.00% 
III 0.03% 1.15% 1.81% 51.01% 0.19% 45.81% 
 
The table illustrates the composition of investments for each bancassurance group for the period 
2005-2011. Groups are defined as follows: I) insurers independent from banks; II) insurers controlled 
by banks; III) joint ventures. 
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Table 4 – Sample size 
 Group I Group II Group III Total 
2005 55 14 20 89 
2006 54 14 20 88 
2007 51 14 20 85 
2008 47 14 21 82 
2009 43 13 21 77 
2010 40 14 21 75 
2011 41 11 19 71 
Firm-year 
observations 
331 94 142 567 
 
The table illustrates the size of our sample for the period 2005-2011. Bancassurance groups are 
defined as follows: I) insurers independent from banks; II) insurers controlled by banks; III) joint 
ventures. 
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
 Mean St.Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Min Max 
Weight of equity inv. 0.0179 0.0220 0.0002 0.0098 0.0271 0.0000 0.1305 
Weight of fixed income  0.6469 0.2449 0.4925 0.6955 0.8389 0.0029 0.9997 
Equity inv. (logit transf.)  -0.8411 0.0787 -0.8952 -0.8220 -0.7831 -0.9677 -0.6707 
Fixed income (logit transf.)  -0.2900 0.1882 -0.4146 -0.2664 -0.1495 -0.8535 -0.0003 
 
The table illustrates descriptive statistics for the following dependent variables:  
-the ratio of equities on total investments,  
- the ratio of fixed income instruments on total investments 
For both we provide the linear measure and its logit transformation used in our regression model. 
Total investments comprise land and buildings, investments where the risk is retained by insurers and 
excluding intra-group exposures, investments where the risk is borne by policyholders. 
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Table 6 – Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
 Mean St.Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Min Max 
PropClass I 0.6325 0.2926 0.4072 0.6961 0.8869 0.0000 1.0000 
PropClass III 0.2377 0.2880 0.0132 0.1178 0.3690 0.0000 1.0000 
PropClass IV  0.0008 0.0112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2624 
PropClass V  0.1122 0.1584 0.0022 0.0374 0.9820 0.0000 0.9820 
PropClass VI 0.0169 0.0487 0.0000 0.0000 0.4089 0.0000 0.4089 
Assets (mln) 5,431 8,997 568 1,953 5,974 12 59,743 
 
The table illustrates descriptive statistics for independent variables. Business mix is proxied by the 
ratio premiums collected in each class of business on total written premiums (PropClass). Classes are 
described as follows: I) Traditional and with-profits policies; III) Unit- and index-linked policies; IV) 
Health insurance; V) Capital redemption policies; VI) Collective pension funds. Assets are total assets 
of each insurer, in million Euro, and represent the proxy for size. 
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Table 7 – Sample size by specialization and bancassurance model (2005-2011) 
Year Group Specialized Diversified Total 
2005 
I 22 33 55 
II 4 10 14 
III 4 16 20 
All groups 30 59 89 
2006 
I 27 27 54 
II 5 9 14 
III 5 15 20 
All groups 37 51 88 
2007 
I 28 23 51 
II 9 5 14 
III 10 10 20 
All groups 47 38 85 
2008 
I 31 16 47 
II 7 7 14 
III 12 9 21 
All groups 50 32 82 
2009 
I 36 7 43 
II 11 2 13 
III 17 4 21 
All groups 64 13 77 
2010 
I 34 6 40 
II 9 5 14 
III 14 7 21 
All groups 57 18 75 
2011 
I 34 7 41 
II 10 1 11 
III 12 7 19 
All groups 56 15 71 
 
The table illustrates the size of our sample with reference to the level of specialization and for each 
bancassurance model. Specialization is measured as the Rumelt’s index for diversification, with 
specialization occurring for more than 70% of premiums written in a single product. Bancassurance 
groups are defined as follows: I) insurers independent from banks; II) insurers controlled by banks; III) 
joint ventures. 
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Table 8 – Results of pooled OLS regression  
 POLS1 – Equities  POLS2 – Fixed income  
 Coeff. Std.Err. t-value   Coeff. Std.Err. t-value  
Intercept -39.07936 *** 
(<0.001) 
3.987 -9.802 
 
3.99467 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.486 8.213 
Log(PropClassI)  0.36579 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.105 3.497 
 
0.17877 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.013 14.007 
Log(PropClassIII)  0.16790 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.049  3.436 
 
-0.06885 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.006 -11.548 
Log(PropClassV) 0.11361 ** 
(0.009) 
0.044 2.592 
 
0.04491 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.005 8.399 
Log(PropClassVI)  -0.10390 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.031  -3.338 
 
-0.00929 * 
(0.015) 
0.004 -2.445 
Specialization -2.88169 *** 
(<0.001)     
0.850   -3.389 
 
0.25379 * 
(0.015) 
0.104 2.446 
Log(Assets) 2.22268 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.254 8.752 
 
-0.22481 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.031 -7.255 
Group II -3.95152 *** 
(<0.001)     
1.031   -3.834 
 
-0.62373 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.126 -4.960 
Group III 1.34680 
(0.137) 
0.904 1.490 
 
-0.93853 *** 
(<0.001) 
0.110 -8.509 
Year_2006 -0.62709 
(0.626)     
1.285   -0.488 
 
0.11899 
(0.448) 
0.157 0.759 
Year_2007 0.14391 
(0.913)     
1.314    0.110 
 
0.07670 
(0.632) 
0.160 0.479 
Year_2008 -0.01158 
(0.993) 
1.341   -0.009 
 
0.29084 
(0.076) 
0.164 1.778 
Year_2009 0.02431 
(0.986)     
1.403    0.017 
 
0.18147 
(0.289) 
0.171 1.060 
Year_2010 -0.10935 
(0.938)     
1.404   -0.078 
 
0.40148 * 
(0.019) 
0.171 2.343 
Year_2011 0.22760 
(0.874)     
1.430    0.159 
 
0.47956 ** 
(0.006) 
0.174 2.749 
Observations 567  567 
R-squared 0.3449  0.6612 
Adj. R-squared 0.3283  0.6526 
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F-test 20.76 *** 
(<0.001) 
 76.96 *** 
(<0.001) 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance at the 0.999 level, ‘**’ at 0.99 and ‘*’ at 0.95  
The table illustrates results for our pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is either 
the ratio of own investments held in equities or in fixed income. P-values are provided in brackets. 
 Log(PropClass III) is the logarithm of premiums collected on unit- and index-linked policies on total 
written premiums. Specialization is the dummy measured as the Rumelt’s index for diversification, 
with specialization occurring for more than 70% of premiums written in a single product. Log(Assets) 
is the proxy for size as the logarithm of total assets. Bancassurance groups are defined as follows: I) 
insurers independent from banks; II) insurers controlled by banks; III) joint ventures. 
 
